**Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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BASIC FACTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REALIZATION OF THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLES IV AND V OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Background paper by the Secretariat

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at its first session (1 to 5 May 1989), invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare for the Committee's second session a background paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the request of the Committee, at its second session (11 to 15 September 1989), the background paper was revised and updated for the Committee's third session (23 April - 2 May). At that session, the Committee requested that, in the light of the comments made during its discussion, the background paper be updated and revised as necessary where appropriate for submission to the Review Conference. The present paper is submitted in response to that request and covers developments between September 1985 and May 1990; it confines itself to a very brief summary of the events before 1985, a detailed presentation of which can be found in the background papers on the same subject prepared for the Second Review Conference (NPT/CONF.II/4) and for the Third Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/4), respectively.

2. Actions in implementation of article IV of the Treaty have been taken by parties to the Treaty either bilaterally or multilaterally, while actions relative to article V have been largely multilateral. The bilateral activities as well as those of the private sector, since they have not taken place within the framework of the United Nations, do not fall within the purview of this paper (see para. 6 below). Most of the multilateral activities in relation to both articles have taken place in connection with the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and are reflected in the Agency's papers on its activities under articles IV and V, prepared for the Fourth Review Conference (for details, see background papers NPT/CONF.IV/13 and NPT/CONF.IV/14).

3. Articles IV and V of the Treaty reads as follows:

"Article IV

"1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

"2. All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

"Article V

> "Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements."

4. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly held in 1978, includes the following paragraphs relevant to the subject under discussion:

> "36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
>
> "...
>
> "66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
>
> "68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

> "69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.
>
> "70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened."

5. The Final Declaration of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in May 1975, made extensive reference to the implementation of both articles IV and V of the Treaty (see NPT/CONF.35/I-III). In the general debate at the Second Review Conference in 1980, the development and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a major focus of attention. The Review Conference was not able, however, to agree on a Final Declaration (for details see NPT/CONF.III/4). The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference in 1985 contained a major section on the implementation of article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 dealing with the subject of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a section on article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. The relevant part of the Final Declaration (NPT/CONF.III/64/I-III) is reproduced in the annex to the present document.

I. CONSIDERATION OF ARTICLE IV

A. The General Assembly of the United Nations

6. A considerable volume of peaceful nuclear co-operation through which article IV is being implemented takes place in the framework of private companies. However, since the request made by the Preparatory Committee is to provide "basic facts within the framework of the United Nations", the nuclear co-operation conducted between industrial or commercial enterprises in the private sector is not covered by this paper. In the period between the Third and the Fourth Review Conferences, as in the past, most multilateral activities related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy took place within the framework of IAEA. The Agency's activities under article IV were also reflected in the debates and resolutions of the General Assembly. During the period under review, the General Assembly had on its agenda the item entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" and until 1987 also the item entitled "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" (UNCPICPUNE). The two items were discussed mainly in plenary meetings, but also in the First Committee.

7. In 1985, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/8 1/ on the report of IAEA. By that resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, affirmed its confidence in the role of IAEA in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it urged all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its Statute, in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes; in

strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguard system.

8. By resolution 40/95, 2/ the General Assembly, inter alia, approved the conclusions and decisions contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy including the dates of the Conference, from 23 March to 10 April 1987; expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Secretary-General of the Conference by undertaking consultations in order to assist the Committee in expediting the preparations for the Conference; noted with satisfaction the progress made in those preparations and requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to continue with the preparations. In addition, the General Assembly invited IAEA, the specialized agencies and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system to contribute further to the preparations of the Conference and invited all States to co-operate actively in the preparations for the Conference.

9. In 1986, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which was originally scheduled for 1983 but postponed until 1987 due to substantial differences between certain developed and developing States about the purposes of the Conference, held its seventh and final session at Vienna from 10 to 21 November. The Committee was informed that the inter-sessional intergovernmental working group it had established, had been unable to approve a report for submission to the Committee. Therefore, the Committee decided to establish for continuing the remaining work an open-ended contact group under the guidance of the Chairman. Subsequently, based on the deliberations of the contact group, the Preparatory Committee developed four working papers and agreed to forward them to the Conference for the latter's consideration. Those papers contained proposed possible recommendations on appropriate ways and means of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a proposed outline of the output document of the Conference, and proposed procedures and topics for the work of its Committees I and II. At the same session, the Preparatory Committee decided that other papers which had been circulated, presented or considered at the meetings of the inter-sessional intergovernmental working group, the contact group or the current session of the Committee, but were either not discussed or discussion on them was inconclusive, should also be forwarded to the Conference.

10. At its forty-first session, the General Assembly, in resolution 41/212 A 3/ of 11 December 1986, noted with satisfaction that the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had successfully concluded its work. Recalling that the Conference represented a global effort specifically for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, the General Assembly invited all States to participate in it at an appropriately high level. In resolution 41/212 B 4/ of the same date, the Assembly appealed to all Governments to take into account, during the Conference, the legitimate interests of neighbouring countries that could be affected by transboundary effects of the use of nuclear energy. The General Assembly also appealed to all Governments to ensure that the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants are applied in order to minimize risks to life and health.

11. The General Assembly also adopted resolution 41/36 5/ on the report of IAEA. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, affirmed its confidence in the role of IAEA in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It urged all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of IAEA, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to health; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. In addition, the General Assembly welcomed the signing by a significant number of States of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, both of which had been concluded in 1986.

12. In 1987, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/6 6/ on the report of IAEA. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, affirmed its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It urged all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to health; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

13. In resolution 42/24, 7/ the General Assembly took note of the report of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (see section below) and expressed its belief that the Conference had served a useful purpose in examining the role of nuclear energy in economic and social development, and in the complex problems in the promotion of international co-operation in that vital field. Furthermore, the General Assembly recognized that the technical reports presented at the Conference could be used in planning programmes for development, use and safety of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and authorized their publication in the official languages of the United Nations. In addition, the General Assembly requested IAEA, as the central organization for peaceful nuclear co-operation, to continue its efforts, in close collaboration with the concerned specialized agencies and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system, with the specific aim of strengthening and broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development. The Assembly urged all States to co-operate fully in support of all efforts aimed at fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development. Finally, the Director General of IAEA was requested, in the annual reports of the Agency, to continue to report on the progress made in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

14. At the Fifteenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in 1988, several speakers referred to the issue of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the work of IAEA. 8/ Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden submitted a memorandum on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons (A/S-15/14). The five Nordic countries, in their working paper, also made reference to the subject under consideration and stated that an effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The availability on a predictable and long-term basis of nuclear materials, equipment and technology should be assured under adequate non-proliferation and safeguard commitments. Among the measures the Nordic countries held to be important in this context, were the following in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy: acceptance by all non-nuclear-weapon States of full-scope IAEA safeguards, that is, IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities present and future; the requirement of an international legally binding commitment, from recipient States, not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards as a minimum condition for exports by all supplier States of relevant nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States; steps toward separation of civilian and military nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States, with application of IAEA safeguards in the civilian nuclear sector in these countries; measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology in a predictable manner, with appropriate assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; further strengthening of the safeguards system of IAEA in order to increase its capacity also in view of the development of nuclear technology; and full co-operation by all States with IAEA in its implementation of safeguards under existing and future bilateral and multilateral agreements.

15. The General Assembly, in 1988 and 1989, adopted resolutions 43/16 9/ and 44/13 10/, respectively, on the report of IAEA. By those resolutions, the General Assembly as in previous years, *inter alia*, affirmed its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It urged all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute, in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to life, health and the environment; in stengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

16. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on related issues, namely on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, on Israeli nuclear capabilities and on the question of the dumping of nuclear waste.

17. The question of South Africa's nuclear capability was mainly discussed in connection with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1989, adopted resolutions 40/89 A, 41/55 A, 42/34 A, 43/71 A and 44/113 A. 11/ By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, condemned South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and called upon all States, corporations, institutions or individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that might enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The General Assembly furthermore demanded that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA (see also NPT/CONF.IV/5). By another series of resolutions, which specifically dealt with the nuclear capability of

South Africa - resolutions 40/89 B, 41/55 B, 42/34 B, 43/71 B and 44/113 B 12/ - the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its full support for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability, commended the action taken by those Governments which had taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields. The General Assembly commended the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) and 591 (1986) on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field. In addition, the Assembly demanded once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA (see also NPT/CONF.IV/5).

18. The question of Israeli nuclear capabilities and specifically the Israeli military attack of 7 June 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear installations at Osirak, was discussed by the General Assembly in the context of the agenda items on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, on the prohibition of radiological weapons and on Israeli nuclear armament (see also NPT/CONF.IV/5). By resolutions 40/82, 41/48, 42/28, 43/65 and 44/108, 13/ the General Assembly, inter alia, invited the countries concerned to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and called upon all countries of the region that had not done so, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. By resolutions 41/59 I, 42/38 F, 43/75 J and 44/116 A, 14/ the General Assembly, expressing its firm conviction that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constituted an unprecedented danger to international peace and security, inter alia, reaffirmed that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released. Finally, by resolutions 40/93, 41/93, 42/44, 43/80 and 44/121, 15/ the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its condemnation of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa; requested the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487 (1981), in which, inter alia, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and demanded by itself that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The General Assembly called upon all States and organizations that had not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field; reiterated its request to IAEA to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel that could contribute to its nuclear capabilities; and requested the Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel might take to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The Secretary-General, in pursuance of resolution 41/93, in 1987 submitted a report to the General Assembly, entitled "Israeli nuclear armaments" (A/42/581).

19. In 1988, the General Assembly for the first time adopted two resolutions on the subject of radioactive waste dumping, reflecting growing concern of many primarily African countries about the illegal disposal of radioactive and industrial wastes in their territory. By resolution 43/75 Q, 16/ the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States to ensure that no nuclear-waste dumping practices occur that would infringe upon the sovereignty

of States; welcomed the decision of IAEA to establish a representative technical working group of experts with the objective of establishing an internationally agreed code of practice for international transaction involving nuclear wastes. By resolution 43/75 T, 17/ the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear-waste dumping practices that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States; expressed profound concern regarding practices of dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, which had grave implications on the national security of African countries; and called upon all States to ensure that no radioactive waste was dumped in the territory of other States in infringement of their sovereignty. By both resolutions, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the issue of radioactive waste dumping. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 R, 18/ initiated by African States. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed grave concern regarding any use of nuclear waste that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States; called upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States; and requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material.

B. United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE)

20. The United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy took place in Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987, with 106 States participating. It provided for a comprehensive exchange of views on the question of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

21. The Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to the Conference that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could reach its full potential only in a world from which its potentially destructive uses had been eliminated, and it was thus logical and wise to see the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons as necessary for the realization of the full peaceful benefits of the Atom. The aim of the Conference, he said, must be to establish an appropriate framework for enhanced international co-operation in the field that would serve the interests of both the technologically advanced and the developing countries.

22. In the course of the general debate in plenary meetings, all speakers agreed on the need for more international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several of them stressed the need for adequate safety precautions and measures to prevent abuses of nuclear technology. Among them, Canada, which had nuclear co-operation agreements with over 20 countries, including a number of developing countries, stated that Canadians were deeply concerned about the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It held that supplier nations as well as recipients had a responsibility to ensure that those risks were minimized and, where possible, eliminated altogether. Sweden emphasized the strong link

between assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation. It held that the search for solutions must be based on the fact that neither aspect could be promoted without due regard for the other. Among the mainly non-aligned countries that argued for unrestricted access to nuclear technology and asserted that the transfer of technology and services required for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be on an equitable basis, Chile held that co-operation in the nuclear energy field should be subject only to technical considerations deriving from the true needs of the people. It believed that all countries must be permitted to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by nuclear energy.

23. Several delegations stressed the importance of non-proliferation and considered the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty an essential basis for co-operation. The Byelorussian SSR maintained that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would not be possible without a further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, and believed that bilateral agreements should play an important role in international co-operation to regulate the use of nuclear technology. According to New Zealand, the linkage between promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing its spread to military applications was a strong and necessary one. It was convinced that the non-proliferation Treaty represented the best assurance currently available that the further spread of nuclear weapons would be subject to constraints.

24. A number of countries maintained that the non-proliferation Treaty was discriminatory. For example, Yugoslavia asserted that the Treaty was being used unjustifiably to limit the transfer of nuclear technologies and fuels to developing countries, while the nuclear-weapon States themselves had not complied with the Treaty's basic provisions. It stated that the problem of proliferation could not be solved by restrictions, barriers or any other unilateral measures; what was needed was to strengthen co-operation and mutual trust among all countries. In Canada's view, non-proliferation requirements did not act as constraints in the development of nuclear programmes. Instead, they provided the political framework within which nuclear commerce must be conducted if the international community was to be reassured that such co-operation would not promote proliferation. Norway also believed that IAEA safeguards activities had not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

25. A number of countries noted that they were using nuclear power to help meet their energy requirements because of the high cost of oil, the scarcity of other resources, or environmental concerns. However, Austria viewed with concern the construction of nuclear power facilities and the growing risks arising from an increase in fuel reprocessing and the transport of radioactive materials. The representative of Denmark noted that public opposition to nuclear power had intensified in his country. Ireland favoured a phase-out of nuclear electricity generation, because it was convinced that nuclear power presented unacceptable risks to the public. Several speakers referred to constraints that hampered the introduction and development of nuclear energy in developing countries. India noted that difficulties experienced by those countries in promoting nuclear energy were different, depending upon the stage of their nuclear power programme and the infrastructure and resources available to them. Those constraints could arise from deficiencies in various areas: industrial, research and development support; access to technology;

scientific and technical information; availability of skilled manpower and assurance of supply of nuclear materials; and equipment and fuel cycle services. It stated that IAEA had an essential role to play in helping member States to overcome some of the impediments in the technical and scientific areas. In Nigeria's view, constraints facing African countries stemmed from a lack of co-operation on the part of developed countries. It suggested that financial institutions such as the World Bank should make long-term "soft loans" for nuclear energy development. It favoured the promotion of regional co-operation in nuclear energy programmes and the development of regional facilities for enhancing research and training in the peaceful applications of nuclear science.

26. The delegations generally agreed that IAEA should continue to play its central role among multinational institutions in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of them expressed appreciation of the Agency's technical assistance programmes. In Finland's view, IAEA had, during its 30 years of existence, gained pre-eminence as an organ for international co-operation, and the Conference should make every effort to support the Agency in that task. Mongolia indicated that through IAEA's valuable assistance, the use of radioactive isotopes in health, agriculture, geological research and mining had brought many benefits to its people. Mexico felt that IAEA should play the principal role in carrying out any decisions and recommendations of the Conference.

27. All speakers emphasized the importance of nuclear safety. Austria believed it imperative to consider nuclear safety, co-operation in the case of nuclear accidents, and liability for damages caused by nuclear installations as important subjects for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union advocated the creation of an international system for the safe development of nuclear power. The Soviet Union stated that after the Chernobyl accident, measures had been taken nationally and internationally, and others had been recommended, to ensure safety in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the acceptance of responsibility in case of accidents. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, observed that the Chernobyl accident had highlighted the need for strict safety and security measures at all stages of the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as in plans to handle the consequences of nuclear accidents. Among those that expressed concern about the transboundary effects of possible nuclear accidents, Ireland held that countries should implement their programmes in conformity with the highest possible levels of safety and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. Turkey felt that safety issues in the event of transboundary releases had not been adequately dealt with by the two international Conventions that were adopted as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

28. The Conference worked in two main committees. Committee I addressed principles universally acceptable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and appropriate ways and means for the promotion of such co-operation, and in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation. Committee II dealt with the role of nuclear power for social and economic development and the role of other peaceful applications of nuclear energy, such as food and agriculture, health and medicine, and industry, for social and economic development. In its

discussion on principles, Committee I based its deliberations on a draft set of principles submitted by non-aligned countries. It considered all the proposals and documents discussed or submitted by the Preparatory Committee relevant to those matters, as well as other proposals and documents presented at the Conference. The Committee attempted to reach agreement on the subject-matter entrusted to it, but because of differences of view, that was not possible. Committee II discussed extensively the role of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, hearing a total of 103 reports by delegations covering a wide range of subjects. They included: nuclear energy planning; nuclear energy production; other applications of nuclear energy; nuclear safety and radiological protection; spent fuel and radioactive waste management; legal, administrative and regulatory aspects; personnel training. 19/

29. In his concluding statement, the President of the Conference, noting the lack of agreement on acceptable principles, said that the Conference had nevertheless provided a remarkable international forum where each country had been given the opportunity to explain its position, interests, concerns and hopes. He underlined the importance of the considerable number of national papers and scientific research studies that had been submitted. Many countries could benefit from them in preparing or applying their nuclear programmes. The Secretary-General of the Conference concluded that the Conference had served several useful purposes. It had stimulated ideas, promoted the establishment of contacts, and disseminated valuable information that could be extremely useful not only to the participants in the Conference, but also to Governments and the public at large. In its report (A/CONF.108/7), the Conference, inter alia, considered that the technical reports presented and the discussions that took place during the Conference on the role of nuclear power and of other peaceful applications of nuclear energy for economic and social development could be used in planning national programmes for development, use and safety of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (see also para. 13 above).

C. Other international actions

30. During 1985 and 1986, an International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), composed of 13 experts from nuclear safety licensing authorities, the nuclear industry and bodies dealing with research and development in the field of safety, elaborated recommendations for a considerable expanded nuclear safety programme. A consensus report of the Group was submitted for consideration by IAEA's Board of Governors in 1986. In 1988, INSAG began the elaboration of a set of safety principles. The report entitled "Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants" (INSAG-3) reflects the most advanced policies and practices being pursued at nuclear power plants in areas of siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, accident management and emergency response (see NPT/CONF.IV/13).

31. Following a nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in April 1986, a special session of IAEA was held from 24 to 26 September 1986. After consideration of the role of nuclear energy and measures related to nuclear safety and radiological protection the following two Conventions were adopted: (a) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and (b) Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological

Emergency. The Notification Convention entered into force on 27 October 1986 and the Assistance Convention on 26 February 1987. As of September 1988, 31 States had become parties to the former and 26 to the latter.

32. On 21 September 1988, a one-day diplomatic conference on the relationship between the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was held at IAEA headquarters. The 51 States that attended adopted by consensus a protocol - the Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention - which will have the effect of extending the existing civil liability régime and avoiding possible conflicts of the applicable law. The General Assembly, by resolution 43/16 (see para. 15 above), inter alia, noted with appreciation the adoption of the Joint Protocol.

33. During the period under review, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) continued its work. A report entitled "Genetic and Somatic Effects of Ionizing Radiation" (A/41/16) was published in 1986, and another report entitled "Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation" (A/43/45) was published in 1988.

II. CONSIDERATION OF ARTICLE V

A. The General Assembly of the United Nations

34. The question of peaceful nuclear explosions has been considered at recent sessions of the General Assembly only within the framework of the consideration on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes arises in that context because it seems not to be possible to develop nuclear explosive devices which would be capable only of peaceful application, and in practice it would be extremely difficult to differentiate between a nuclear-weapon test and a peaceful nuclear explosion. Therefore, it is generally felt that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have to contain provisions, acceptable to all, which would prevent the circumvention of the nuclear-weapon test ban by means of explosions for peaceful purposes.

35. On the other hand, article V of the non-proliferation Treaty explicitly obliges the parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty. However, as the Third Review Conference to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1985 stated, the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated. During the period under review, as in previous years, no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been made by any non-nuclear State party of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

36. A number of proposals and ideas for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, forwarded by various Member States in the past - including the report on the trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom held between 1977 and 1980; the basic provisions of a CTBT proposed by the Soviet Union in 1982 and a draft treaty proposed by Sweden in 1983 20/ - refer to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. They suggest

that arrangements concerning peaceful nuclear explosions might take the form of a special agreement - possibly a protocol - or agreements constituting an integral part of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

37. The General Assembly, in the period under review, adopted numerous resolutions on the issue of a nuclear-test ban. They dealt, inter alia, with the following subjects: (a) multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions, and as a provisional measure, a moratorium on all nuclear-test explosions, which should include appropriate means of verification; (b) commencement by the Conference on Disarmament of practical work on a nuclear-test ban treaty and appropriate verifiable interim measures; (c) negotiations in the CD on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests including adequate measures of verification and provisions to prevent the circumvention of the ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and, pending the conclusion of such a treaty a moratorium on nuclear explosions; (d) the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the partial test-ban Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty and (e) the notification of nuclear tests (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/2).

38. In 1986, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) entered into force. The Treaty of Rarotonga is the first international treaty which has specifically banned peaceful nuclear explosions (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/16).

B. The Conference on Disarmament

39. Between the third and fourth Review Conferences, the Confrence on Disarmament has occasionally considered the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and other relevant matters, primarily in the context of a comprehensive test ban. The main questions continue to be (a) whether the carrying out of a peaceful nuclear explosions programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State is compatible with the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and (b) whether a comprehensive test-ban treaty should ban nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

40. In 1987, the Group of Socialist States, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a new version of "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (CD/756). The relevant paragraph reads as follows:

> "3. Provisions should be made for the formulation of a provision preventing the ban on nuclear weapon test explosions from being circumvented by means of peaceful nuclear explosions."

41. During the period under review, the debates on the issue of a nuclear-weapon test ban took place at plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference had before it draft mandates for the establishment of an ad hoc committee from each of the three major groups, but it was unable to agree on a compromise formulation (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/9).

Notes

1/ Resolution 40/8 was introduced by Indonesia and adopted without a vote.

2/ Resolution 40/95 was initiated by Yugoslavia and adopted without a vote.

3/ Resolution 41/212 A was initiated by Yugoslavia and adopted without a vote.

4/ Resolution 41/212 B was initiated by Austria and adopted by 119 votes to none, with 28 abstentions.

5/ Resolution 41/36 was introduced by Pakistan and adopted without a vote.

6/ Resolution 42/6 was introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany and adopted without a vote.

7/ Resolution 42/24 was introduced by Egypt, whose representative had been President of UNCPICPUNE, and was adopted without a vote.

8/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, A/S-15/PV.1 to PV.22.

9/ Resolution 43/16 was introduced by Canada and adopted without a vote.

10/ Resolution 44/13 was introduced by Japan and adopted without a vote.

11/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/89 A (148-0-6); 41/55 A (150-0-5); 42/34 A (151-0-4); 43/71 A (151-0-4); 44/113 A (147-0-4).

12/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/89 B (135-4-14); 41/55 B (139-4-13); 42/34 B (140-4-13); 43/71 B (138-4-12); 44/113 B (137-4-10).

13/ All resolutions were adopted by consensus.

14/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 41/59 I (111-3-38); 42/38 F (119-2-32); 43/75 J (116-2-29); 44/116 A (124-2-26).

15/ The resolutions, which were initiated by Arab States, were adopted with the following voting results: 40/93 (101-2-47); 41/93 (95-2-56); 42/44 (97-2-52); 43/80 (99-2-51); 44/121 (104-2-43).

16/ Resolution 43/75 Q was initiated by Nigeria and adopted by 129 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

17/ Resolution 43/75 T was initiated by Zaire and adopted by 141 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

18/ Resolution 44/116 R was adopted by 150 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

19/ The complete list of the reports is contained in document A/CONF.108/7, annex III.

20/ For the proposals see CD/130; A/37/243; CD/381, respectively.

Annex

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 AND ARTICLE V IN THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

4. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

6. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations.

7. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfil their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.

8. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfer and subsequent operations should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licenses and authorization involved should take place in a timely fashion.

9. While recognizing that the operation and management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international and multilateral collaboration for arrangements in this area.

10. The Conference expresses its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq's safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981. The Conference recalls Security Council resolution 487 of 1981, strongly condemning the military attack by Israel which was unanimously adopted by the Council and which considered that the said attack constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency on this attack, including resolution 425 of 1984 adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA.

11. The Conference recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

12. The Conference encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance in accodance with international law to any Party to the NPT, if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack, and calls upon all States to abide by any decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter in relation to the attacking State.

13. The Conference considers that such attacks could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity and that such attacks or threats of attack jeopardize the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also acknowledges that the matter is under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and urges co-operation of all States for its speedy conclusion.

14. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide

spectrum of applications, related both to power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Conference notes that the Agency's assistance to the developing States party to the Treaty has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy.

15. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States party to the Treaty.

16. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in citing, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision to be strengthened;

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries;

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans;

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole;

(v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries;

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA;

(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

17. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.

18. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

19. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

20. Great and serious concerns were expressed at the Conference about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and that the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. The Conference noted the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. The Conference recognizes the growing nuclear energy needs of the developing countries as well as the difficulties which the developing countries face in this regard, particularly with respect to financing their nuclear power programmes. The Conference calls upon States party to the Treaty to promote the establishment of favourable conditions in national, regional and international financial institutions for financing of nuclear energy projects including nuclear power programmes in developing countries. Furthermore, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to support the work of an expert group study on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion of their nuclear power programmes, including the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund.

22. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries for obtaining finance, and recommends such countries as are members of the Agency to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of some of the developing countries.

23. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and its conviction that UNCPICPUNE will fully realize its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

24. The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the Third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCPICPUNE.

Article V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of article V and other applicable international obligations, that such services should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference confirms that the IAEA would be the appropiate international body through which any potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States under the terms of article V of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Second NPT Review Conference.

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/5
9 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

BASIC FACTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REALIZATION OF THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Background paper by the Secretariat

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at its first session (1 to 5 May 1989), invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare for the Committee's second session, or as soon thereafter as practicable, a background paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of article VI of the Treaty. At the request of the Committee, at its second session (11 to 15 September 1989), the background paper was revised and updated for the Committee's third session (23 April-2 May 1990). At that session, the Committee requested that, in the light of the comments made during its discussion, the background paper be updated and revised as necessary where appropriate for submission to the Conference. This paper is submitted in response to that request and covers developments up to 15 June 1990. It confines itself to a very brief summary of the events before 1985, a detailed presentation of which can be found in the background papers on the same subject prepared for the Second Review Conference (NPT/CONF.II/5) and for the Third Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/5), respectively.

2. Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty reads as follows:

> "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The parties to the Treaty, in the eighth preambular paragraph, declared "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament". Furthermore, in the last preambular paragraph, they recalled that, "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".

3. The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security. They also expressed their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty which are: (a) the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament; (c) the promotion of co-operation between States Parties in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also declared the reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty and their determination to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.

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4. The Final Declaration, furthermore, stated that since no agreement had been reached in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under article VI had not yet been achieved.

5. The Third Review Conference reiterated that the implementation of article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference particularly called upon the nuclear-weapon States Parties to demonstrate this commitment.

6. During the period currently under review, a significant part of the General Assembly's deliberations have addressed questions relating to various aspects of nuclear disarmament. A considerable number of proposals have been submitted by Member States, and the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on the subject. The efforts made since the Third Review Conference to undertake measures of nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament are described in the following pages. The positions of the Member States are reflected in statements and documents regarding specific measures for the issues on the agenda. The question of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons is dealt with in two separate papers (NPT/CONF.IV/2 and NPT/CONF.IV/9).

7. During the period, there were no negotiations on general and complete disarmament as such, but a number of deliberations and negotiations on partial measures as well as on a comprehensive programme of disarmament were undertaken. They are described in chapter II of the present paper.

I. MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR-ARMS RACE AND TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

A. Non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war

8. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2, paragraph 4, calls on all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Since 1945, the United Nations has been particularly concerned about the possible use of nuclear weapons and has sought preventive measures against that threat. Proposals discussed at different times and in different contexts have ranged from unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to prohibition of first use and conditional bans.

9. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, declared that: "Removing the threat

of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation" (resolution S-10/2, para. 18). It furthermore stated that the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons (para. 57). It appealed to all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. The Final Document also called upon all States actively to participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (para. 58).

10. In the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982, the General Assembly reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of 1978, expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remained the most acute and urgent task of the present day, and urged all Member States to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind was not endangered (A/S-12/32, para. 62).

11. The fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, was held from 31 May to 25 June 1988. Although, owing to the divergency of views and the differences in the positions of States, no substantive document could be adopted, a realistic and constructive atmosphere prevailed throughout the proceedings. In the course of the session, many delegations supported the view that the prevention of nuclear war is of utmost concern to the international community and that specific efforts, bilateral, regional and multilateral, should be vigorously pursued, and measures should be further strengthened to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of nuclear war.

12. In 1988 the General Assembly, at its forty-third session, adopted resolution 43/77 B, 1/ entitled "Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" which was initiated by Yugoslavia. By that resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, considered that the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, had served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas where future efforts should be concentrated and underscored the urgency that States should work resolutely for the common cause of curbing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and achieving disarmament.

13. During the period under review, a number of resolutions, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" were initiated by India. The General Assembly, by resolutions 40/151 F, 41/60 F, 42/39 C, 43/76 E and 44/117 C, 2/ *inter alia*, reaffirmed that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. It

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reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the respective resolutions.

14. By resolutions 40/152 A, 41/86 B, 42/42 A, 43/78 B and 44/119 B, 3/ entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" which were initiated by the German Democratic Republic, the General Assembly considered that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States (China and USSR) made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective declarations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offered an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war and expressed the hope that those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so would consider making similar declarations. The Conference on Disarmament was requested to commence negotiations on the agenda item concerning the prevention of nuclear war and to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

15. Another series of resolutions on the subject of the prevention of nuclear war was initiated by Argentina. The General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/152 Q, 41/86 G, 42/42 D and 43/78 F, 4/ by which it, inter alia, noted with regret that despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it had been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it. The General Assembly reiterated its conviction that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it was necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war. It again requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its subsequent session. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/119 E, 5/ entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war". By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish ad hoc committees at the beginning of its 1990 session on both the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war with adequate mandates in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference on Disarmament could best contribute to progress on these two urgent matters.

16. In 1985 and 1986, the General Assembly, by resolutions 40/152 G and 41/86 H, 6/ respectively, which were initiated by Mexico, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, which would examine, inter alia, its socio-economic consequences and would take into account the Secretary-General's report (A/40/449 and Corr.2) and the source documents from which the compilation was prepared, together with any other relevant scientific studies. The study, entitled "Study on

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the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war" (A/43/351) was transmitted to the General Assembly in 1988. The General Assembly, by resolution 43/78 D, 7/ expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Group of Consultant Experts that had assisted him in the preparation of the study and commended the study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States. Another report prepared by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 39/48 P, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" (A/40/498) was transmitted to the General Assembly in 1985.

17. The United States and some other Western States, which did not support most of the above resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, expressed their belief that the question of preventing nuclear war could only be dealt with satisfactorily in a broader context of the prevention of war in general and that nuclear weapons continued to be a basic element in the balance needed to maintain peace and security. In the view of NATO States, a declaration of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons would restrict and thus undermine the wider principle of the non-use of force in the Charter of the United Nations. NATO member States pointed to the inconsistencies which they saw between proposals on non-first use of nuclear weapons and Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which drew no distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. They reaffirmed that at present there was no alternative to the strategy of deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable. At the same time they reiterated that none of their weapons would ever be used, except in response to armed attack.

18. The Disarmament Commission, between 1985 and 1990, addressed the question of the prevention of nuclear war under item 4 of its agenda, concerning various aspects of nuclear and conventional disarmament. The item was discussed in both plenary meetings of the Commission and the subsidiary body dealing with item 4. Delegations mainly maintained their established positions and although progress was made towards resolving outstanding issues, consensus could not be reached on a complete set of recommendations.

19. The Conference on Disarmament, during the period between 1985 and 1990, discussed agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". A number of documents were submitted dealing with procedural as well as substantive aspects of the question. 8/ Each year consultations were held to consider an appropriate organizational arrangement to deal with the item, including proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary body, but no agreement could be reached. At each session, following those consultations the Group of 21 put before the Conference for decision a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee (CD/515 and Rev.1 to 5) under which the Committee would, as a first step, consider all proposals relevant to the agenda item including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of Western countries could not associate itself with a consensus on the proposed mandate. The Group stressed the overriding necessity of avoiding war and intimidation and of strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age, and some Western States believed that the problem of the prevention of a nuclear war could only be dealt with satisfactorily in a broader context of the prevention of war in general. The

Group of 21 regretted the inability of the Conference to set up an ad hoc committee and expressed the hope that the importance of the matter would lead to a rethinking on the part of those who had expressed reservations on the proposed mandate. The Group of socialist States expressed its full support for the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 and regretted that the Conference was not in a position to adopt it. While the Group believed that the establishment of an ad hoc committee offered the best available machinery for the conduct of its activities on the item, it stated that it remained open to any procedural arrangements that would allow the Conference to commence concrete work.

20. The Group of 21 reiterated its conviction that the greatest peril facing mankind was the threat to survival posed by nuclear weapons and that, consequently, the removal of that threat was the most acute and urgent task of the present day. It held that while nuclear-weapon States bore the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations had a vital interest in the negotiations of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. Taking into account the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, the Group considered that invoking the United Nations Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack, was neither legitimate nor justifiable. Members of the Group considered that the belief in the maintenance of world peace through nuclear deterrence was the most dangerous fallacy that existed. The socialist States reaffirmed that the prevention of nuclear war was the most urgent task at present. Members of the Group stated that there was a growing conviction throughout the world that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there could be no victors in such a war, that all wars, whether nuclear or conventional, should be prevented, that the creation of a secure peace called for the manifestation of new political thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace, and presupposed the total elimination of nuclear weapons, renunciation of the concept of "nuclear deterrence" and of a policy of the use or threat of force in relations between States. Some Western delegations, including three nuclear-weapon States, reiterated that the question of preventing nuclear war could not be isolated from the problem of preventing war and that the question at issue was how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. They stressed that this comprehensive approach to the prevention of war was in no way designed to belittle the catastrophic consequences and the inadmissibility of a nuclear war. They underlined the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and preserving peace in Europe since 1945 and held that nuclear weapons continued to be a basic element in the balance needed to maintain peace and security.

B. Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

21. Proposals for measures concerning the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons go back to the early period of disarmament deliberations within the framework of the United Nations. A wide range of measures have been put forward which involve, in one form or another, limitations, reductions and/or the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in paragraph 20, stated: "Effective measures of nuclear

disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved ...". It further stressed, in paragraph 50, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for: (a) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; (b) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and (c) a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. In the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session, all Member States reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action (A/S-12/32, para. 62).

22. The complete elimination of all nuclear weapons has consistently been the ultimate objective of the United Nations in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in paragraph 47, stated: "Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

23. At the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly in 1988, many delegations reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament remained a priority objective and represented a central task of the international community. Comments and proposals relating to nuclear disarmament predominated at the session, reflecting the importance given to such issues by Member States. Although those proposals could not be formalized in a concluding document, owing to differences in priorities and approaches, and differing views of the utility of the proposals put forward, many of them found their way into resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its subsequent regular sessions.

24. The General Assembly, in the period under review, adopted resolutions 40/152 P, 41/86 F, 42/42 C and 43/78 E, 9/ entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", which were initiated by Argentina. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its subsequent session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for: (a) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapons systems; (b) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (c) substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination. In 1985, by resolution 40/152 C, 10/ initiated

by the German Democratic Republic, the General Assembly called upon the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and especially to begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc committee. In 1989, at the initiative of Argentina, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/119 E, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war" (see para. 15 above).

25. However, the deliberations on the subject of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, in the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission as well as in the Conference on Disarmament, have revealed differing views among Member States with respect to a number of issues.

26. The Disarmament Commission, between 1985 and 1990, addressed the question of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament under item 4 of its agenda, concerning various aspects of nuclear and conventional disarmament. The item was discussed in plenary meetings of the Commission as well as by a Contact Group established by the Committee of the Whole, and a number of documents were submitted dealing with the subject. 11/ The discussion within the Contact Group focused on a compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4 with a view to reaching consensus on a set of recommendations to be submitted to the General Assembly. Although the Group made progress towards resolving outstanding issues and arrived at agreed formulations for some recommendations, it was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations.

27. The Conference on Disarmament, in the period under review, has continued the consideration of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", in plenary and informal meetings. Documents pertaining to this item have also been submitted by delegations. 12/ During the period, the Conference considered a number of proposals submitted by various delegations and groups of delegations including those by the Group of 21 (CD/526 and CD/819), and by a group of socialist States (CD/523) for a decision by the Conference with a view to setting up a subsidiary body on the issue. No consensus, however, could be reached on any of the above-mentioned proposals (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/10).

28. In recent years, besides traditional proposals focusing on specific aspects of nuclear disarmament - as, for example, a nuclear-weapon freeze, the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes or the prohibition of certain types of nuclear weapons - new comprehensive proposals for nuclear disarmament have been advanced. However, such proposals have not been viewed as useful or acceptable by all States.

1. Comprehensive nuclear disarmament proposals

29. In January 1986, the Soviet Union proposed a programme for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 (A/41/97). During the first stage

of the programme, to be implemented within the subsequent five to eight years, the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce by half their nuclear weapons that could reach each other's territories. The first stage would also include the complete elimination of the intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles of those two Powers in Europe and their renunciation of the development of space strike weapons. During the second stage, which should start no later than 1990 and last from five to seven years, the other nuclear-weapons States would begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. They would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to station them in the territories of other countries. The two major Powers would continue with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and carry out measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear arms. Following the completion of the 50 per cent reduction in the Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States would eliminate their tactical nuclear arms and cease nuclear-weapon testing. During the third stage, which would begin no later than 1995, the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons would be completed and a universal accord would be drawn up to ensure that such weapons would never again come into being. According to the programme, the verification of the destruction or limitation of arms would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections, and the elimination of nuclear weapons should go hand-in-hand with measures relating to other weapons.

30. An Action Plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order (A/S-15/12) was submitted to the General Assembly by India at the fifteenth special session. During stage I of that Plan, to be implemented within the subsequent six years, from 1988 to 1994, the following nuclear disarmament measures would take place: elimination of all Soviet and United States land-based medium- and shorter-range missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty; agreement on a 50 per cent cut in Soviet and United States strategic arsenals; agreement on a phased elimination by the year 2000 of United States and Soviet short-range battlefield and air-launched nuclear weapons; cessation of production of weapon-grade fissionable material by all nuclear-weapon States; a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. Stage II, the duration of which would also be six years, from 1995 to 2000, would comprise the following nuclear disarmament measures: completion of stage I reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union and the induction of all other nuclear-weapon States into the process of nuclear disarmament; elimination of all medium- and short-range, sea-based, land-based and air-launched nuclear missiles by all nuclear-weapon States; elimination of all tactical battlefield nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States; entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. During stage III, to be implemented within 10 years, from 2001 to 2010, the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world would be completed and a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system be established, which, inter alia, would ensure that no nuclear weapons were produced. The Action Plan also contained a series of collateral measures as well as measures relating to other weapons. The final objective would be the universal adherence of all nations to the comprehensive global security system.

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31. Steps towards the objective of comprehensive nuclear disarmament were also referred to in other proposals submitted at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly. The non-aligned countries, in the Final Communiqué of the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament issues of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held at Havana immediately before the special session (A/S-15/27), called for the 50 per cent elimination of all Soviet and United States strategic weapons followed by the incorporation of other nuclear-weapon States into the process of nuclear disarmament. Towards this end, a timetable should be adopted for the gradual elimination of all nuclear weapons. The elaboration and adoption of a comprehensive, phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of these weapons by the year 2000 was proposed in the document entitled "Security through disarmament", submitted by the Warsaw Treaty member States (A/S-15/26). Detailed suggestions on such a programme are contained in a working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/S-15/23). China called for a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States (A/S-15/20), and Romania suggested the creation of a special body for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons (A/S-15/30). The ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was also referred to in a memorandum on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (A/S-15/14). In the view of the United Kingdom, the implementation of its ambitious programme of far-reaching and detailed nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons disarmament measures would represent the most significant development in arms control and disarmament in our era (A/S-15/11). The Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, *inter alia*, emphasized the extreme urgency of adopting measures for achieving nuclear diarmament through a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (A/44/551).

2. Nuclear-weapon freeze

32. At the twelfth special session, for the first time proposals for a nuclear-weapon freeze were submitted by India as well as by Mexico and Sweden. Between 1985 and 1987, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/151 E, 41/60 E and 42/39 B, 13/ initiated by India. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, called upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The General Assembly, also adopted resolutions 40/151 C, 41/60 I, and 42/39 H 14/ on the same subject, initiated by Mexico. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, urged the Soviet Union and the United States, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The freeze would embrace a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; and complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

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33. Since 1988, the sponsors of the two sets of resolutions merged their drafts to resolutions 43/76 B in 1988 and 44/117 D in 1989 respectively, 15/ entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze". By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged once more the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would, inter alia, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The General Assembly, furthermore, called upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear-arms freeze, which would embrace a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles; the complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles; and the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

34. In 1985, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/94 H, 16/ initiated by the Soviet Union. By that resolution, the General Assembly reaffirmed its appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to freeze, from a specific date, their nuclear arsenals on a global scale and under appropriate verification as a first step to their reduction with the view to their complete elimination; urged once again the Soviet Union and the United States to freeze their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis; and expressed its strong belief that all the other nuclear-weapon States should subsequently and as soon as possible freeze their nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other hand, held that the arms control process could not be regulated by artificially imposed procedures and timetables. In the areas in which the United States was negotiating arms control agreements, it had declared that it was proceeding with the utmost practicable speed. But in the view of the United States, arms control negotiations involve highly complex technical issues, and could not be disassociated from international politics and security. As a consequence, undue haste could undermine the security objectives that were the primary reason for arms control.

3. Prohibition of certain types of nuclear weapons and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

35. In the early 1980s, an initiative was undertaken aimed at preventing the emergence of a new type of nuclear weapon with enhanced radiation effects and reduced blast and thermal effects, the so-called "neutron weapon". This initiative was continued in 1985. The General Assembly, by resolution 40/152 H, 17/ initiated by the German Democratic Republic, reaffirmed its request to the Conference on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework, with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons as an organic element of negotiations, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. In the view of the States that did not support the proposal, the enhanced radiation weapon was only one particular type of nuclear weapon and fell within the general problem of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. Therefore, these States saw no reason for giving it special treatment or for making specific provisions with respect to it in treaty form.

36. At various times and in various forums proposals have been made for the cut-off of the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses. This measure is mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Final Document as one step within the framework of a staged process of nuclear disarmament.

37. In the period under review, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/94 G, 41/59 L, 42/38 L, 43/75 K and 44/116 H. 18/ In these resolutions, which were initiated by Canada, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

38. The conclusion of a special international agreement on the cessation and eventual complete prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons was advocated by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the USSR in a working paper (A/CN.10/117), submitted to the Disarmament Commission in 1989. In this context, the Soviet Union reported that it had ceased the production of enriched uranium in 1989 and that after having closed down one reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium in 1987, it planned to close down a few more such reactors in 1989 and 1990. By the year 2000 all remaining reactors in the Soviet Union would have been shut down. The USSR furthermore proposed that agreement be reached on refraining from military applications of nuclear materials released as a result of nuclear disarmament agreements and on developing appropriate verification mechanisms. The United States, for its part, stated that it had not produced highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes since the mid-1960s, and that its plutonium production reactors were temporarily closed. In the view of the United States, restraints on, or cut-offs of, fissile material production would not constitute, or in any way further, arms control. They would undermine deterrence and did not address the issue of primary importance, that was, the reduction of weapons and the threats which necessitate those weapons. The United States felt, moreover, that the possibility of secret stockpiles of fissile materials and clandestine production facilities was not addressed by those proposals, which could not be verified.

4. Tactical nuclear weapons

39. Negotiations on tactical nuclear arms in Europe were proposed by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in April 1989 (A/44/228). Those States believed that, along with the elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the phased reduction and eventual elimination of the tactical nuclear arms in Europe would help to lessen the danger of war, to strengthen confidence and to establish a more stable situation on the continent. Accomplishing that task, in the view of the Warsaw Treaty Organization member States, would facilitate progress towards deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms and, in a larger perspective, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. The member States of NATO, in their Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament adopted at the NATO summit meeting in May 1989, declared that once implementation of an agreement on

conventional force reductions in Europe was under way, the United States, in consultation with the allies concerned, was prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels. In April 1990, NATO agreed to start negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons after the conclusion of a conventional force reduction agreement. NATO, in decisions taken in 1979 and 1983, unilaterally withdrew 2,400 (i.e., 35 per cent) United States tactical nuclear weapons based in Western Europe. The Soviet Union announced that, in the course of 1989, it would unilaterally withdraw 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of its allies and stated its willingness to make further unilateral cuts in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe without delay, if the NATO countries would be ready to enter into negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. The USSR furthermore declared that it was prepared to withdraw during 1989-1991 all nuclear ammunition from the territories of its allies on the condition of a similar reciprocal step on the part of the United States. Taking another unilateral step, the Soviet Union in June 1990, announced that in the course of the year it would reduce 60 more short-range nuclear missiles as well as 50 pieces of nuclear artillery and 1,500 nuclear charges in Central Europe.

C. Bilateral United States/USSR negotiations in the nuclear field

40. Although bilateral in nature, negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States have repeatedly been a main subject of debate and deliberations, both in the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament. Both countries have informed the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, on various occasions, as to the status of their negotiations. The General Assembly has regularly adopted resolutions on the subject.

1. Negotiations on nuclear and space arms

41. The Soviet Union and the United States, in January 1985, agreed to hold negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and intermediate/medium-range, with all those questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The stated objective of the negotiations was to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. The sides believed that ultimately the negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere (CD/570 and CD/571). Following the commencement of the nuclear and space talks, in March 1985, numerous proposals and counterproposals were tabled by both parties, but important differences of opinion remained throughout 1985 and 1986.

42. After the meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, in October 1986, both sides moved closer to an agreement on the issue of intermediate/medium-range nuclear missiles. The remaining problems were resolved in the course of 1987, and on 8 December, the Treaty on the elimination of their

intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles was signed (see sect. 2 below). Concerning strategic offensive arms, the two sides, having made significant progress at their summit meeting in Washington, D.C., in December 1987, towards the conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50 per cent reduction, decided to instruct their negotiators at Geneva to work towards the completion of a treaty at the earliest possible date. Among the issues that required further attention in this regard were subceilings on certain types of strategic offensive arms, effective verification procedures and the timetable for reductions.

43. Further progress was noted at the summit meeting in Moscow, May/June 1988. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev stated that a "Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" had been elaborated in which extensive and significant areas of agreement and also detailed positions on remaining areas of disagreement were recorded. The two leaders noted that while important additional work was required before the treaty would be ready for signature, many key provisions were recorded in the joint draft text and were considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the treaty. Both sides have also prepared joint draft texts of an inspection protocol, a conversion or elimination protocol, and a memorandum of understanding on data, which would be integral parts of the treaty. During the summit meeting in Moscow, the exchanges resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of air-launched cruise missiles and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. Both sides expressed their joint confidence that the extensive work done provided the basis for concluding the treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and agreed to continue their efforts energetically and purposefully. At a meeting held from 22 to 23 September 1989 in Wyoming, the United States Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union had a detailed discussion of nuclear and space issues. They agreed, inter alia, to drop the approach of a non-withdrawal commitment to the ABM Treaty while continuing to discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Both sides were of the opinion that this approach opened the way to achieving and implementing a START Treaty without reaching a defence and space agreement. At the Malta summit meeting, held from 2 to 3 December 1989, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to strive for the conclusion of basic provisions of a START Treaty at the next summit meeting scheduled for June 1990. During the Washington Summit Meeting from 30 May to 4 June 1990, the President of the United States, George Bush, and the President of the USSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In a joint statement, the two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the progress achieved so far. They welcomed the solutions which had been found on major issues and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990 (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/6). The two Presidents further agreed that, following the signing of the Treaty, they would hold consultations without delay regarding future talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Meanwhile, the two sides will continue negotiations on ABM and space within the negotiating framework on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

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2. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

44. On 8 December 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). The Treaty was the result of long and detailed negotiations between the two States. It entered into force on 1 June 1988 after the exchange of instruments of ratification by the United States President and the General Secretary. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of that historic agreement, which for the first.time will eliminate an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms (A/S-15/28).

45. The Treaty covers ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) of "intermediate-range" (1,000-5,500 kilometres) and of "shorter-range" (500-1,000 kilometres). Intermediate-range missiles will be eliminated not later than three years, and all shorter-range missiles not later than 18 months, after the Treaty's entry into force. Integral parts of the Treaty, which consists of a preamble and 17 articles, are a protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems and a protocol regarding inspections, as well as a memorandum of understanding on data, giving the locations, numbers and characteristics of each side's intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (CD/798 and CD/800).

46. In the preamble, the parties express their conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war. They recall their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The basic obligation of the two parties consists of an undertaking to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles together with their launchers, all support structures and support equipment. The Protocol on Elimination provides that the nuclear warheads and guidance elements may be removed from the missiles, prior to their elimination. The most notable aspect of the Treaty is found in its verification provisions. The Treaty builds upon verification arrangements previously agreed on between the two sides, but also adds important forms which together cover all known principles for a reasonably reliable verification system (for details see NPT/CONF.IV/6).

47. The conclusion of the Treaty has been universally welcomed in the hope that it will not only lead to an improvement in the relations between the two parties, but will also have a positive impact on the security of Europe and the whole world by enhancing international stability and giving a new impetus to ongoing multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations. In this regard, the United States expressed concern that while the United States and the USSR were eliminating all ground-based missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres, many nations were currently developing and, in some cases, testing such delivery systems. At the Wyoming ministerial meeting, held in September 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union noted the importance of joint efforts by both sides and agreed to activate bilateral consultations on that pressing problem.

48. As noted earlier, the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions on the subject. In 1985 and 1986, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/18 and 41/86 N, 19/ initiated by Yugoslavia. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct their bilateral negotiations with the greatest resolve with a view to achieving agreements on concrete and effective measures for the halting of the nuclear-arms race, radical reductions of their nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In 1987 and 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 42/38 D 20/ and 43/75 A 21/ respectively, initiated by Zimbabwe, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The General Assembly, by the first resolution, inter alia, welcomed the agreement in principle between the Soviet Union and the United States to sign the INF Treaty in the autumn of 1987 and to make intensive efforts to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms. By the second resolution, the General Assembly in welcoming the ratification and commencement of implementation of the INF Treaty, called upon the Soviet Union and the United States to exert every effort to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms as part of the process leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 K. 22/ By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note with satisfaction of the positive developments in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR and called upon both States to accelerate their efforts to achieve a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive nuclear arms as early as possible, as part of the process leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

49. In the period between 1985 and 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/152 B, 41/86 A, 42/38 A, 43/75 O and 44/116 B, 23/ initiated by the United Kingdom. The General Assembly, by the first three resolutions, inter alia, called upon the Soviet Union and the United States to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of all their agreed objectives in the negotiations. By resolution 43/75 O, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the ratification and commencement of the implementation of the INF Treaty and called upon both sides to spare no effort in seeking, in accordance with the security interest of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, the attainment of all the agreed objectives in the negotiations, that is, the resolution of a complex of questions concerning space and strategic nuclear arms with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. By resolution 44/116 B, the General Assembly, in addition, welcomed the fact that the provisions of the INF Treaty were being implemented by the United States and the USSR. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolutions 41/59 F, 42/38 H, 43/75 E and 44/116 D, initiated by China. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the USSR and the United States, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to accelerate negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals. In addition, by resolution 44/116 D, the General Assembly welcomed the continued implementation of the INF Treaty by the United States and the USSR.

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3. Agreements to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war

50. Following the agreement reached at the summit meeting in November 1985 at Geneva between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to study at the expert level the question of the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres, on 15 September 1987, the two sides signed the Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, which entered into force on the date of the signature (CD/814 and CD/815). According to the Agreement, which also included two protocols, each side agrees to establish, in its capital, a national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre. Those centres began operation in April 1988 and serve as confidence-building measures intended to reduce the risk that nuclear war might be initiated by miscalculation, accident, or misunderstanding. The agreement provides that the parties are to transmit through the centres information and notifications, as required under current agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, of 1971, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, of 1972. The notification exchange may be altered or expanded to relevant new agreements. Under one such new agreement the centres are used to exchange data and provide notifications as required by the INF Treaty, and the Protocol on Elimination. The centres are not intended to replace other arrangements undertaken between both sides, such as the Agreement on Measures to Improve the United States of America-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Direct Communication Link (Hot-line agreement) of 1963.

51. During the Moscow summit meeting between the USSR and the United States, 29 May to 2 June 1988, both sides signed an Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, which entered into force on the date of the signature, 31 May 1988. According to that Agreement, each party agreed to provide the other party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (CD/845 and CD/847). In the view of both sides, the Agreement is a practical step, reflecting the desire of the two States to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident. An Agreement between the United States and the USSR on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (CD/943) was signed in Moscow on 12 June 1989. At the Wyoming ministerial meeting, held in September 1989, both sides signed an agreement on advance notification of major strategic exercises which will further expand and complement the above agreements. At the Washington summit meeting in May/June 1990, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to pursue talks with the objective of reducing further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries.

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D. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

52. The question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States figures prominently among current issues, in particular those related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On 19 June 1968, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968) in which it welcomed the intention expressed by nuclear-weapon States that they would provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Nevertheless, since the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, the non-nuclear-weapon States have repeatedly requested that the undertaking to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be met by an assurance that nuclear weapons would not be used against them under any circumstances.

53. At the first Review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty, in 1975, a draft additional protocol to the Treaty regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty was proposed by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire (NPT/CONF/22 and Add.1 and 2). According to that proposal, the Depositary Governments of the non-proliferation Treaty would, inter alia, undertake (a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty whose territories were completely free from nuclear weapons, and (b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

54. In 1978, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the five nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, individually made declarations designed to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 24/ The Final Document of the special session, in paragraph 59, called upon the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly noted the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

55. Since the 1978 special session, different approaches to the question have emerged. One approach seeks the conclusion of an international convention on the subject. The General Assembly, in the period under review, adopted resolutions 40/85, 41/51, 42/31, 43/68 and 44/110, 25/ initiated by Bulgaria. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, recommended that the Conference on Disarmament pursue intensive negotiations in its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching such an agreement, taking into account the widespread support in the Conference for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective. Furthermore, it appealed to all States, in

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particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate willingness and exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a common approach to, including the possibility of a common formula in, an international instrument or instruments of a legally binding character, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Another series of resolutions was initiated by Pakistan. The General Assembly, by resolutions 40/86, 41/52, 42/32, 43/69 and 44/111, 26/ inter alia, appealed to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; and recommended that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties. Furthermore, the General Assembly recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective. The nuclear-weapon States have repeatedly reaffirmed their willingness to participate in the search for a common formula to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, owing to the inherent complexity of this problem, no agreement on a common formula has yet been reached.

56. A different approach, supported by the United States and other Western countries, is based on the premise that widely varying situations and concerns must be taken into account by the nuclear-weapon States. These States stress that it is justified that the States renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons should receive in return the assurance that these weapons would not be used against them. They hold that such an assurance, however, should remain qualified by a provision of non-attack in alliance or in association with a nuclear-weapon State. In 1978, the United States suggested that the individual declarations of the nuclear-weapon States should be formalized by the Security Council (A/C.1/33/7) and in 1979 it proposed as an alternative that the General Assembly adopt a resolution incorporating the pledges of the nuclear Powers (CD/27 and resolution 34/86). That initiative has not been pursued since then.

57. In the period under review, each year, with the exception of 1986, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee continued to concentrate its discussions primarily on the scope and the nature of the arrangements on the understanding that an agreement on the substance of the arrangements could facilitate agreement on the form. It held a structured and goal-oriented debate in which various proposals and some new ideas were explored and a clearer understanding of the many issues involved was achieved. 27/ Work on the substance of the effective arrangements and discussions on various aspects and elements of a solution, however, revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon

States persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula". On 1 March 1990, Nigeria submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a proposal for an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (for details, see NPT/CONF.IV/17).

E. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

58. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly stated that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure (resolution S/10-2, para. 60). According to the Final Document, the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they were genuinely free from nuclear weapons (para. 61). The nuclear-weapon States in turn were called upon to give undertakings in particular to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone (para. 62). Furthermore, the Final Document advocated a number of measures to be undertaken in various regions, including Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia (para. 63).

59. The dominant factor in the development of interest in the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been the desire to secure the complete absence of nuclear weapons from various areas of the globe, where suitable conditions exist for the creation of such zones, to free the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war, to make a positive contribution to the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, towards nuclear disarmament and ultimately general and complete disarmament, and thereby to strengthen international peace and security. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has stemmed from the realization that a number of States in various regions of the world have or could have the capacity to develop a nuclear-weapon capability within a relatively short period. This situation could present new threats to the security of States in areas at present free from nuclear weapons; could precipitate a ruinously expensive and perilous nuclear-arms race in those areas; and could add new dangers of nuclear war to an already threatening world situation. Another important benefit could be the creation of a framework for regional co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

60. In addition to the two treaties on zones free of nuclear weapons - the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga (see sections below) - proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions. Besides those concerning Africa, the Middle East and Asia, proposals have also been presented with respect to the Balkans, Central Europe, Northern Europe and the

Mediterranean. In addition, note should be taken of existing international agreements aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to certain areas and environments, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

61. At the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1988, two working papers were submitted on the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In working paper A/S-15/16, submitted by New Zealand, special reference is made to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga as the only two examples so far for nuclear-free and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Other respective States which have not yet done so, are called upon, to become parties to the additional Protocols of the respective Treaty and the special session is requested to reaffirm the value and importance of nuclear-free and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In a second working paper (A/S-15/32), submitted by the German Democratic Republic, it is, *inter alia*, proposed that the special session could stress the importance of nuclear-free zones for international security and for efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world; reaffirm the principles set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; take note of existing proposals and ongoing regional efforts for the creation of such zones, and call upon nuclear-weapon States to co-operate with the respective non-nuclear-weapon States.

1. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

62. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco on 14 February 1967. The Treaty defines the obligations of the contracting parties and the zone of its application and establishes the International Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to ensure compliance with the Treaty, together with a control system that includes the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities. The Treaty has two Additional Protocols relating to undertakings to be entered into by (a) States outside the zone having *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility for territories lying within the Treaty's geographic zone, which would thereby commit themselves to apply the status of denuclearization to those territories (Protocol I) and (b) the nuclear-weapon States, which would undertake not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty (Protocol II). 28/

63. The General Assembly, in the period under review, adopted resolutions 40/79, 41/45, 42/25, 43/62 and 44/104, 29/ initiated by Mexico. By these resolutions, the General Assembly deplored that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which had taken place on 2 March 1979, had not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitation which the General Assembly had addressed to it. The Assembly once more urged France not to delay such ratification any further. France, for its part, stated that it would, in due course, take the necessary decision in the light

of the state of ratification of the Treaty itself. The United States repeatedly called for the Treaty to be brought into force for all eligible States in the region and called on the States in the region that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty, or to put it into force by waiving paragraph 28 of the Treaty.

2. South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

64. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty was signed on 6 August 1985, at Rarotonga, Cook Island, after almost a decade of consultations and negotiations mainly within the framework of the South Pacific Forum. The Treaty entered into force on 11 December 1986 and to date has eleven parties. The Treaty of Rarotonga creates a "nuclear-free", rather than a "nuclear-weapon-free" zone. The former term was chosen for a number of reasons. It was the intention of the signatories to the Treaty to keep the region free of the stationing of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and environmental pollution by radioactive waste. Moreover, they wished to prohibit all types of nuclear explosions. Accordingly, the Treaty provides, inter alia, that each State party to the Treaty undertakes not to manufacture, acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear device inside or outside the zone. Moreover, each party undertakes to conduct any nuclear activities in co-operation with other States in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use, and to support the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the non-proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system of IAEA. While exercising its sovereign right to decide for itself whether to allow foreign ships (which may be nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed) to visit its ports or to navigate its territorial seas, or foreign aircraft to visit its airfields or fly over its airspace, each party undertakes to prevent any nuclear explosive device from being stationed in its territory, and also undertakes not to test any such device or to assist others to do so. It further undertakes not to dump or store radioactive waste anywhere at sea within the zone and to prevent such dumping or storing by anyone in its territorial sea. The Treaty text has been circulated as official documents of the United Nations, IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament.

65. Three protocols are integral parts of the Treaty. Under Protocol 1, the States outside the zone which have jurisdiction over territories within the zone (France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States) upon becoming parties to the Protocol, would undertake to apply the Treaty's key provisions to those territories. Under Protocol 2, all five nuclear-weapon States, upon becoming parties to it, would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any parties to the Treaty. Under Protocol 3, the same five States, upon becoming parties to it, would refrain from nuclear testing within the zone. China and the Soviet Union ratified Protocols 2 and 3 in 1988. France, the United Kingdom and the United States have indicated that they do not intend at this time to become parties to any of the protocols. The United States stated in 1987 that "in view of its global security interests and responsibilities, it was not under current circumstances in a position to sign the protocols". However, the United States declared that its practices and activities in the South Pacific region were consistent with the Treaty and its protocols, and

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the United Kingdom announced that it would respect the intentions of regional States on Protocols 1 and 3 (for details see NPT/CONF.IV/16).

66. The creation of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone has received favourable comments from a large number of States in and outside the United Nations. In the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 1985, the Conference welcomed the agreement reached to establish the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (NPT/CONF.III/64/I). In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/119 F, 30/ initiated by New Zealand. By that resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, noted with satisfaction that 11 members of the South Pacific Forum had ratified the Treaty, that China and the Soviet Union had adhered to Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty and noted that the United Kingdom and the United States had stated that none of their practices and activities within the Treaty area were inconsistent with the Treaty or its Protocols.

3. Africa

67. The General Assembly, each year since 1974, has considered the question of the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. In the period between 1985 and 1989, the General Assembly, under the agenda item "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", adopted two series of resolutions, initiated by members of the African Group.

68. By resolutions 40/89 A, 41/55 A, 42/34 A, 43/71 A and 44/113 A 31/ which dealt with the question of the implementation of the Declaration, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, strongly renewed its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; reaffirmed that the implementation of the Declaration would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security; expressed its grave alarm at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapons capability and condemned all forms of nuclear collaboration with the racist régime; called upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that might enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration and demanded that South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the IAEA; appealed to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard. Finally, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the OAU might seek regarding the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa (see also NPT/CONF.IV/4).

69. By resolutions 40/89 B, 41/55 B, 42/34 B, 43/71 B and 44/113 B, 32/ entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested

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the Disarmament Commission to consider as a matter of priority, during its annual sessions, South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, inter alia, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability; commended the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) and 591 (1986) on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field. Finally, it requested the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly. Pursuant to these requests, the Secretary-General submitted reports A/42/649, A/43/701 and A/44/655 on South Africa's nuclear capability, which as in previous years were based on material provided by IAEA containing information on recent developments regarding that issue (see also NPT/CONF.IV/4).

70. In the Disarmament Commission, the item on South Africa's nuclear capability, between 1985 and 1990, was considered in a working group established by the Commission. During that period, the working group devoted its efforts mainly to elaborating a set of recommendations on the basis of working papers and proposals submitted by various delegations, particularly the paper by the African States (A/CN.10/43 and Rev.1). In the course of deliberations, differences of view among delegations centred on some fundamental concepts and elements emphasized in that text, particularly South Africa's nuclear-weapons capability and its verifiability. At its session in 1990, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus a document entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa, conclusions and recommendations" and so concluded its consideration of that item.

4. Asia

(a) South Asia

71. Since the twenty-ninth session in 1974, the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has regularly been included in the agenda of the General Assembly. During the period under review, it adopted resolutions 40/83, 41/49, 42/29, 43/66 and 44/109, 33/ initiated by Pakistan. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; urged the States of the region to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective and called upon those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to that proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

(b) South-East Asia

72. In 1983, Indonesia suggested in the then Committee on Disarmament that the ASEAN States should establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a region covering Indonesia, Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. At their summit meeting in December 1987, the ASEAN States, inter alia, emphasized that ASEAN should intensify its efforts towards the early establishment of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, including the continuation of the consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the zone and of an appropriate instrument to establish the zone. Viet Nam, at the third special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament supported the initiative and welcomed the drafting by the ASEAN States of a respective instrument. Participants at the second Jakarta Informal Meeting (Brunei Darussalam, the four parties of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and Indonesia), held from 19 to 21 February 1989, shared the view that a comprehensive political solution of the Kampuchea question would accelerate the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace in South-East Asia (A/44/138-S/20477). At the Conference on Disarmament in 1990, Indonesia reiterated that, in the light of the positive developments in East-West relations in 1988/1989, there was a strong need to encourage the establishment of such a zone.

(c) North-East Asia

73. The idea of establishing a North-East Asian Nuclear-Free Zone was developed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in a working paper (A/S-15/19), submitted at the third special session devoted to disarmament, in 1988. According to that proposal, the zone should be a nuclear-free zone, its objective containing reduction of the naval nuclear forces at the same time, should exclude nuclear weapons and their delivery means as well as all offensive and interventional forces and their forward bases as a whole. The process of the North-East Asian Nuclear-Free Zone should start with denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its vicinity. On 9 November 1989, the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK made public a statement clarifying the stand of its Government to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone (S/20964). The Republic of Korea, for its part, stated that considering that some neighbouring States of the Korean peninsula were deploying nuclear weapons, it was unrealistic to single out the issue of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula without taking into consideration the overall strategic balance in Asia.

5. Europe

74. In recent years, various proposals have been made and reiterated for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones relating to certain parts of Europe, particularly the Balkans, Central Europe and Northern Europe.

(a) The Balkans

75. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the idea of turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and of inter-Balkan co-operation for this purpose has been the subject of discussion in Balkan countries. In 1981, Bulgaria proposed the convening of a meeting of the leaders of the Balkan countries to discuss this issue. At their bilateral summit meetings held in subsequent years, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia supported the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or into a zone of peace and co-operation free of nuclear weapons, and made suggestions for elaborating a nuclear-weapon-free status for the Balkans. Statements to the same effect were made by the representatives of the respective countries at the third special session on disarmament as well as at the regular sessions of the General Assembly between 1985 and 1989.

76. At the invitation of Greece, a conference of governmental experts from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia was held in Athens in January/February 1984 with an agenda which included the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. It was agreed by the experts that the ideas, proposals and suggestions which were registered during the conference would be submitted for the consideration of the Governments of the participating States in order to continue the dialogue started at that conference. Since then the idea has been further pursued by representatives of some States in the region at bilateral as well as at multilateral levels (see for example A/43/206 and CD/919).

(b) Central Europe

77. The idea of establishing a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe was originally developed by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission) in 1982. The Swedish Government forwarded this proposal to 28 Governments in Europe and North America, inviting them to give their views on the subject. Subsequently, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic forwarded a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. According to that proposal, the corridor would initially range approximately 150 kilometres on each side of the borderline dividing Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with a subsequent expansion to cover the entire area of Central Europe (A/42/333 and A/42/343). Some Western States, who did not support the proposal, stated that the determinant for a territory to be under nuclear threat was not whether nuclear weapons were stationed there but whether nuclear weapons were aimed at it. Negotiations that merely resulted in moving the nuclear arsenals in Europe farther apart, they felt, would not enhance stability but would only create an illusion of greater security. They would detract from negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

(c) Northern Europe

78. Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, several proposals were made regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe. Inspired by a Swedish proposal in 1961 for a world-wide zone of non-nuclear-weapon States (the

Undén Plan), Finland proposed the creation of such a zone in the Nordic region (the Kekkonen initiative of 1963). The idea gained widening interest in the Nordic countries towards the 1980s, which led to the decision by the Nordic Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in Reykjavik in March 1987, to establish a working group of high officials to investigate the conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as part of the endeavours to lessen tensions and reduce armaments in Europe. The working group bases its work on the alliance commitments and the policy of neutrality applicable respectively in the five countries involved. The result of this study will be presented to the Nordic Foreign Ministers in order to facilitate their continued political deliberations.

6. The Middle East

79. The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East originated with Iran. At the United Nations, the General Assembly has been seized with this question since its twenty-ninth session in 1974 when, as a result of a joint initiative by Egypt and Iran, it adopted resolution 3263 (XXIX), commending the idea of establishing such a zone in the Middle East. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/82, 41/48, 42/28, 43/65 and 44/108. 34/ By these resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, urged the parties concerned to consider taking steps for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; called upon all countries of the region not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on their territory and to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. In resolution 43/65, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The study is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session. Separately, a study on the "Modalities of Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East" was prepared in 1989 by IAEA (GC(XXXIII)/887).

80. In addition, the General Assembly adopted related resolutions 40/93, 41/93, 42/44, 43/80 and 44/121, 35/ initiated by Arab countries. By these resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, condemned Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and the co-operation between Israel and South Africa; expressed its deep concern at Israel's continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and testing of their delivery systems and demanded that it place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; requested the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487 (1981); and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities. Separately, the question of the Israeli attack in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak was continuously discussed by the General Assembly in the period between 1985 and 1989, resulting in the adoption of resolutions on that issue in the context of the prohibition of radiological weapons (see para. 93 below and NPT/CONF.IV/4).

81. The proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has met with wide acceptance in the General Assembly and has enjoyed wide support

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in the region itself, eventually gaining consensus in the General Assembly. While expressing several reservations regarding the approach suggested in the resolutions initiated by Egypt, Israel has joined the consensus on the resolutions. In April 1990, Egypt proposed the establishment of a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. According to that proposal all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be prohibited in the Middle East, i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological; all States of the region, without exception, should make equal and reciprocal commitments in this regard; verification measures and modalities should be established to ascertain full compliance by all States of the region with the full scope of the prohibition without exception (CD/989).

II. MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES RELATING TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

A. General and complete disarmament/comprehensive programme of disarmament

82. For more than two decades partial measures of arms limitation and disarmament have been the focus of attention in disarmament deliberations and negotiations. While the value of such measures continues to be recognized, the desirability of a comprehensive approach also continues to be stressed. The goal of such an approach is to develop a coherent strategy leading to the effective cessation of the arms race and the achievement of continuous, cumulative progress towards general and complete disarmament. For a number of years, a focus of attention in this general approach has been the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the General Assembly stated that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and entrusted the Committee on Disarmament with the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament (resolution S/10-2, para. 109).

83. In addition, to provide further guidance, the Disarmament Commission was specifically entrusted with the task of considering the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the Conference on Disarmament, the negotiating body. The Disarmament Commission discharged its task by adopting, by consensus, the basic elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in 1979. By resolution 34/83 B, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to initiate at its 1980 session negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and, in doing so, to take as a basis the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission. However, neither in the Conference on Disarmament nor at the second and third special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament has it been possible to complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme due to the divergence of views on fundamental substantive issues as well as on organizational and procedural questions.

84. The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1988, by resolution 40/152 D, decision 41/421 B, resolutions 42/42 I and 43/78 K, all of which were initiated by Mexico, urged the Conference on Disarmament to resume the work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme. In 1989, the Conference on Disarmament, by resolution 44/119 A, 36/ was called upon to consider, at the beginning of its 1991 session, the resumption of the work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

85. In the Conference on Disarmament, between 1985 and 1990, the item "comprehensive programme of disarmament" was considered mainly in an *ad hoc* committee of the Conference. A number of proposals and documents were submitted by various delegations. 37/ In 1985, the *ad hoc* committee resumed the task of the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament after it had been suspended in 1984. At that and subsequent sessions, the Committee concentrated its work on the resolution of various outstanding issues. At each session, contact groups were established and consultations were held among interested delegations with a view to resolving existing differences. In addition, at various stages, consultations and informal meetings were held under the guidance of the Chairman. In the course of the work new proposals were submitted. Additional points of disagreement also arose with respect to existing texts. Intensive efforts were made with a view to completing the elaboration of the programme and submitting a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its third special session on disarmament in 1988. In some cases it was possible to reach agreement on the text of the relevant paragraphs and in others considerable progress was made towards harmonizing positions and narrowing areas of disagreement. However, in the time available, it was not possible to reconcile differences on a number of issues and, thus, to complete the elaboration of the programme. The results of the work are contained in the annex to the report of the Conference to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly (A/44/27).

B. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons/new technologies

86. The question of new weapons of mass destruction has been under continuous consideration in the General Assembly and in the negotiating body over a number of years. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly stated, in paragraph 77, that in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements.

87. Between 1985 and 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/90, 41/56, 42/35 and 43/72, 38/ initiated by the Byelorussian SSR. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, reaffirmed that effective measures should be undertaken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction; requested the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep under review, with expert assistance, as appropriate, the question of the

prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons; and called upon all States, immediately following the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament, to give favourable consideration to these recommendations.

88. In the Conference on Disarmament, the issue of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, between 1985 and 1990, was discussed in plenary and informal meetings. 39/ Socialist States and many members of the Group of 21 continued to stress that if any new kind of such weapons was invented and deployed, it would constitute a serious danger to international peace and security. Some Western States held that there was currently no indication that new types of weapons of mass destruction were imminent; hence they considered that there was no need for immediate action by the Conference on Disarmament in the field. Thus, no consensus was reached on convening a group of qualified experts to identify new types of weapons of mass destruction and, if necessary, to recommend specific negotiations on them, as envisaged in the respective General Assembly resolutions.

89. A new initiative aimed at preventing the military use of science and technology was undertaken by India. In a working paper (A/S-15/12, annex II) on new technologies and the qualitative arms race, submitted at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, inter alia, the following suggestions were made: the Secretary-General should have at his disposal a technology assessment and forecasting panel of eminent scientists and strategists for identifying and monitoring those developments in the field of new and emerging technologies which have military applications, for assessing their likely impact on international security, and for making projections based on such monitoring. Similar arrangements should be made at the national level and information and assessment be widely disseminated. The Secretary-General as well as the Conference on Disarmament should play an active part in that respect, and a unit should be established in the Department for Disarmament Affairs to monitor and study the implications of new technologies with potential military applications. According to the proposal, there should be greater international co-operation in the field of research in new and emerging technologies with a view to deploying them for peaceful purposes, and negotiations should also start for banning those technological missions which are clearly designed for the development of new weapons and means of warfare.

90. In subsequent years, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 43/77 A and 44/118 A, 40/ which were initiated by India and entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security". By the former resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those which have potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on international security, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, as appropriate. Furthermore, Member States were invited to establish panels at the national level to monitor and evaluate such developments, to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals as well as the

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evaluations of the national panels and disseminate the assessments provided by the Secretary-General. The General Assembly, by the latter resolution, inter alia, took note of the preliminary work undertaken by the Secretary-General (A/44/487 and Add.1 and 2) and requested him to conclude that work so that a report could be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session; noted that the process of establishing national expert panels by Member States had already begun and encouraged them to participate by communicating their views to the Secretary-General.

91. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/118 B 41/ at the initiative of the German Democratic Republic, which was entitled "Science and technology for disarmament". By that resolution, the General Assembly took note of national and international activities to use scientific and technological achievements for disarmament-related purposes and called upon Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify and extend such activities, to develop international co-operation in that area and to keep the United Nations informed about progress in that field.

C. Radiological weapons

92. The question of prohibiting radiological weapons has been considered by the negotiating and deliberative bodies, particularly within the framework of discussions on the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In 1976, the United States proposed that an agreement be concluded prohibiting the use of radioactive materials for producing radiological weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States held bilateral negotiations on the subject and in 1979 submitted an agreed joint proposal to the Conference on Disarmament. In subsequent years, negotiations were continued in the Conference. However, in the course of the negotiations, some divergent views emerged, regarding questions of approach, priority, definition and verification as well as the question of including a prohibition of military attacks against civilian nuclear facilities.

93. The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1989, adopted consensus resolutions 40/94 D, 41/59 A, 42/38 B, 43/75 C and 44/116 T. In those resolutions, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work. The General Assembly also adopted resolutions 41/59 I, 42/38 F, 43/75 J and 44/116 A 42/ initiated by Iraq. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities (see also NPT/CONF.IV/4).

94. The question of radiological weapons was considered in the Conference on Disarmament between 1985 and 1989 mainly by an ad hoc committee of the Conference with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Various ideas were expressed and a number of documents were submitted by delegations in the course of the deliberations. 43/ During the above-mentioned period, the ad hoc committee

continued to consider the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It was recognized by many States throughout the period that both subjects were important and needed solutions, and it was agreed that the Conference continue to deal with them. The United States, however, remained unpersuaded of the necessity for additional legal protection for civilian nuclear facilities. The United States stated that it opposed all threats of force against States in violation of the United Nations Charter, including attacks against civilian nuclear facilities. However in the United States view, the question of additional legal measures involved a number of serious military, technical, and legal issues. The activities of the ad hoc committee showed, however, that, while further intensive efforts were made to overcome the persistent difficulties, including a number of new proposals and initiatives submitted by various delegations to that end, different approaches continued to exist with regard to both the subjects under consideration, in particular on the scope of prohibition, criteria and definitions, peaceful uses, the relationship of the proposed agreement or agreements with other international measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, as well as on the procedures for verification and compliance and other main elements. The current state of consideration of the issue is reflected in annexes I and II of the report of the ad hoc committee to the Conference in 1989 (A/44/27).

95. The issue of radioactive waste disposal has attracted public concern in the recent past, following various reports of illicit exports and dumping of toxic and nuclear wastes in developing countries. In 1988, the General Assembly, for the first time adopted two resolutions on that subject. By resolution 43/75 Q, initiated by Nigeria, as well as by resolution 43/75 T, 44/ which was initiated by Zaire, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to take into account, in the ongoing negotiation for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the issue of illegal dumping of nuclear wastes in the territory of other States (see also NPT/CONF.IV/4). In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 R, 45/ initiated by African States. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed grave concern regarding any use of nuclear waste that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States and again requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material.

D. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

96. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been for a long time one of the priority items of the disarmament agenda. In recent years, negotiations have continued towards a convention which would go beyond the scope of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972). The First Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention was held in 1980. In the Final Declaration of the Review Conference, the participating States reaffirmed their

strong support of that Convention, their continued dedication to its priniciples and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions. The Second Review Conference was held in 1986. Despite various differences, including the questions of compliance and verification procedures, a Final Declaration was adopted by consensus. By adopting the Final Document, the States parties recognized the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives; affirmed their belief that universal adherence to it would, inter alia, facilitate the wider exchange of information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, and reaffirmed their strong support and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Convention. It was decided to hold a third Review Conference at Geneva not later than 1991. It was also decided to convene an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties to the Convention to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data. In accordance with that decision, an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties to the Convention was held in 1987, at which a report finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration was adopted by consensus, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure. In their report, the experts agreed that information should be provided annually through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which would be responsible for forwarding the information to all States parties to the Convention. Four rounds of the exchange of information have since taken place in one or more of which 28 States have participated.

97. Bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prohibition of chemical weapons began anew in 1986 after having been suspended for several years. At the Moscow summit meeting in 1988, both sides reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons ban and to achieve an effective convention. After the Wyoming ministerial meeting, held in September 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union, in a joint statement on chemical weapons (A/C.1/44/2), reaffirmed their commitment to pursue aggressively the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons on the basis of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban. Both sides considered the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention to this effect to be one of the highest priorities for the international community. The United States and the Soviet Union signed a memorandum of understanding regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange; agreed to undertake a co-operative effort with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons and stated their intention to pursue intensively their bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban with the view to helping to achieve further progress in the multilateral negotiations. Both sides expressed their grave concern about the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the illegal use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons exist and are spread. They underscored their support for the Secretary-General of the United Nations in investigating reports of violations of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. The United States and the Soviet Union expressed the view that a truly global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons was the best means to address the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons on a durable long-term basis.

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98. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly reaffirmed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament (para. 75). The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1989, adopted by consensus resolutions 40/92 B, 41/58 D, 42/37 A, 43/74 C and 44/115 A. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its regret and concern that a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated. The General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, the General Assembly, in resolution 43/74 C, encouraged Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on, and universal adherence to, a convention on chemical weapons. In this regard, the General Assembly recognized the importance of declarations made by States on whether or not they possess chemical weapons and of further international exchange of data in connection with the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. By resolution 44/115 A, the General Assembly took note with satisfaction of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session and requested the Conference to use the political momentum generated by the Paris Conference, held in January 1989 (see para. 102 below), to achieve the conclusion at the earliest possible date of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

99. On the subject of chemical weapons, the General Assembly in 1985 and 1986, adopted resolutions 40/92 A and 41/58 B, 46/ initiated by the German Democratic Republic. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, called upon all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically from the production of new types of chemical weapons, as well as from deploying chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

100. A Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons was held from 18 to 22 September 1989 at Canberra, at the invitation of Australia. In a summary statement by the chairman of the Conference (A/C.1/44/4), the purposes were given as: (a) to assist in the resolution of technical issues and the identification of workable and realistic solutions to other outstanding problems, to enable the early conclusion of the Convention; (b) to convey a clear understanding of the industry's concerns, and an appreciation of how the chemical weapons convention will impact on the industry, so as to ensure not only the speedy conclusion of the convention, but its effective practical implementation. Furthermore, it was stated that the Conference had been the occasion for a number of important developments,

including: (a) the first collective statement by the world's chemical industry of its commitment to assist Governments in bringing about a total ban on chemical weapons through a comprehensive chemical weapons convention; (b) extensive dialogue between Governments and industry on issues relating both to the conclusion and implementation of the treaty, and detailed exploration of ways of progressing that dialogue in the future; (c) the identification of a number of measures in support of the objectives of the chemical weapons convention, which both Governments and industry either are implementing or have indicated a willingness to consider, in advance of its coming into effect; (d) a renewed expression of commitment by Governments to conclude and implement a comprehensive chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

101. A subject of growing concern among Member States in the period under review was the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the danger of the further spread of chemical weapons. In 1985 and 1986, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/92 C and 41/58 C 47/ respectively, initiated by the United States. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, reiterated its concern over reports that chemical weapons had been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk that they might be used again; urged the Conference on Disarmament to pursue vigorously and accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction; and called upon all States, pending the elaboration of such a convention, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons and in efforts to establish facts in cases of reports of such use, and to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons. In the same vein, Australia, in subsequent years initiated resolutions 42/37 C, 43/74 A and 44/115 B. 48/ By these resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States. Furthermore, by resolution 42/37 C, the Secretary-General was requested, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. In addition, the General Assembly, by resolution 43/74 A, bearing in mind the resolutions of the Security Council on the use of chemical weapons adopted during 1988, recalled that, in its resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, the Security Council decided to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly, by resolution 44/115 B, *inter alia*, welcomed the proposals of the group of qualified experts concerning technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and called upon all States to consider the implementation of those guidelines and

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procedures for investigation, inter alia, by putting at the disposal of the Secretary-General qualified experts and/or consultants as well as laboratories for analysis.

102. Between 7 and 11 January 1989, at the invitation of France, a Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States, was held in Paris. In the final declaration adopted by consensus, the participants, inter alia, declared their determination to prevent any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them and solemnly affirmed their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemned such use; recognized the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; stressed the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the Convention at the earliest date. Furthermore, the participating States confirmed their full support for the United Nations and affirmed that it provides a framework and an instrument enabling the international community to exercise vigilance with respect to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons; confirmed their support for appropriate and effective steps taken by the United Nations in this respect in conformity with its Charter and reaffirmed their full support for the Secretary-General in carrying out his responsibilities for investigations in the event of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol. The participating States, recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in 1978, underlined the need to pursue with determination their efforts to secure general and complete disarmament under effective international control, so as to ensure the right of all States to peace and security (A/44/88).

103. In the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were undertaken, during the period under review, mainly in an ad hoc committee established by the Conference. A number of official documents and working papers relating to chemical weapons were presented by delegations. 49/ In accordance with its mandate, the ad hoc committee continued the negotations and further elaboration of the convention on the basis of the work accomplished in previous years and during intersessional periods, as well as on the basis of new proposals. A number of States made declarations regarding chemical weapons and related issues and informed the Conference on visits to military facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons as well as to civil chemical facilities. Other States reported various symposia and seminars. Further exchanges of data and experiments to test verification procedures are under consideration. These measures are intended to promote confidence among the negotiating States, to assist in the drafting of the convention, and to facilitate its early efficient functioning. In 1989, pursuant to a previous proposal, 18 States carried out and submitted final reports on experimental national trial inspections in the civilian chemical industry to enable effective detailed procedures for routine inspections to be elaborated on the basis of practical experience in order to prepare the ground for national and multilateral trial inspections. During the 1989 session, informal open-ended consultations were held, in order to review and analyse national reports and identify aspects needing further consideration in the elaboration of the verification procedures in the convention. As a result of the intensive work accomplished during recent years, considerable progress was achieved in the elaboration of the convention to ban

chemical weapons. That progress is described in the appendices to the report of the _ad hoc_ committee (A/44/27): appendix I, which reflects the current stage of the negotiations on the convention; and appendix II, which contains draft texts to serve as a basis for future negotiations.

104. Proposals for the establishment of zones free of chemical weapons in Central Europe (CD/437; A/C.1/40/2) and in the Balkans (A/41/87) were made individually and collectively by Warsaw Treaty member States. They reaffirmed their resolve to ensure that the proposals made to that effect by the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were implemented (A/42/313-S/18888). In the view of the Warsaw Treaty member States, those regional measures, by leading to the elimination of an entire type of weapons of mass destruction, would consolidate European security and help to weaken the threat of war, strengthen mutual trust and improve the overall political climate. They would, moreover, facilitate the efforts being made on a world scale towards the acceleration of the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which remained the ultimate aim of the Warsaw Treaty member States. The NATO member States argued, however, that chemical weapons could be rapidly reintroduced into such a zone. Moreover, they stressed that in any case in the negotiations for such a zone, problems would have to be solved to a large extent identical to those occurring in the negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, including extremely difficult verification problems. Negotiating efforts would therefore be best concentrated on the latter, more comprehensive, goal.

E. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

105. The subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has received further attention in the period under review, and each year resolutions have been submitted by several groups of States or individual Member States. Since 1983, the General Assembly has been able to merge the ideas presented in the various resolutions and has adopted one resolution annually on the subject. By resolutions 40/87, 41/53, 42/33, 43/70 and 44/112, 50/ the General Assembly, _inter alia_, called upon all States, in particular, those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding and to refrain in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account all relevant proposals and initiatives and to establish an _ad hoc_ committee with an adequate mandate with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

106. Since 1985, the item of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been considered mainly in an _ad hoc_ committee of the Conference on Disarmament. The _ad hoc_ committee, in accordance with its mandate, has examined and identified,

through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space taking into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since 1985. In discharging the tasks set forth in its mandate, the ad hoc committee at the beginning of each session adopted a programme of work covering the following subjects: issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives. In the course of the work, various delegations drew attention to a number of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and various proposals and views were put forward for consideration. 51/ There continued to be general recognition in the ad hoc committee as indicated in the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1989 (A/44/27), of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that common objective. The work carried out by the committee since its establishment and during 1989 contributed to the accomplishment of its task. The committee advanced and developed further the examination and identification of various issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The discussion and the presentations by delegations contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions. It was recognized once more that the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was again recognition of the significant role that the legal régime applicable to outer space plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment and of the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness and of the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. In the course of the deliberations, the common interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes was acknowledged. In this context, there was also recognition of the importance of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies". The ad hoc committee gave preliminary consideration to a number of new proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind. It was agreed that no effort should be spared to assure that substantive work on this agenda item will continue at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament.

F. Prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques

107. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), after having been negotiated by the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975 and 1976, was opened for signature and ratification on 18 May 1977 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary of the Convention. The Convention entered into force on 5 October 1978.

108. The First Review Conference on the ENMOD Convention was held at Geneva from 10 to 20 September 1984 in order to review the operation of the Convention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions were being realized and, in particular, to examine the effectiveness of the provisions in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In the Final Declaration, adopted by consensus, the States parties reaffirmed their strong common interest in preventing the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes, their support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions. The Conference also expressed its conviction that, taking into account the relevant understanding and the present state of technology, the provisions of the Convention remained effective in preventing the dangers of military and other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. At the same time, the Conference recognized the necessity of keeping the provisions of article I dealing with the scope of the Convention and the nature of environmental modification techniques under review and examination. The States parties were called upon to provide information on the research on, and the development of, such techniques. It was decided to hold a second Review Conference at Geneva, not earlier than 1989 and if no review conference was held before 1994, the depositary was requested to solicit the views of all States parties concerning the convening of such a conference (ENMOD/CONF.1/13).

G. Arms limitation and disarmament measures on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof

109. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof entered into force on 18 May 1972. Pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, a review conference of the parties was held at Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977. In its Final Declaration, the Review Conference confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I had been faithfully observed by the States parties to the Treaty (SBT/CONF.I/25). A second review conference was held in Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983. In its Final Declaration, the States parties to the Treaty again confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties. The Conference also reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. In that regard, the Conference noted that negotiations on such measures had not yet taken place and requested that the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (SBT/CONF.II/20).

110. A third review conference was held in Geneva from 19 to 28 September 1989. In its Final Declaration, the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their strong common interest in avoiding an arms race on the sea-bed in nuclear weapons or any

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other types of weapons of mass destruction. They reaffirmed their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions. The review undertaken by the Conference confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties. The Conference reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. In that regard, the Conference noted that negotiations aimed primarily at such measures had not yet taken place and requested that the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Furthermore, all States Parties to the Treaty confirmed that they have not emplaced any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed outside the zone of application of the Treaty and have no intention to do so. In addition, the Conference requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report by 1992, and every three years thereafter on technological developments relevant to the Treaty and to the verification of compliance with the Treaty, including dual purposes technologies for peaceful and specified military ends. Finally, the Conference called upon the States that have not yet become Parties, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, to do so at the earliest possible date (SBT/CONF.III/15).

H. Curbing the naval arms race, naval armaments and disarmament

111. In 1985, pursuant to resolution 38/188 G, the Secretary-General submitted a study on the naval arms race (A/40/535). The General Assembly, in 1985 adopted resolution 40/94 I, 52/ entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans", which was initiated by Bulgaria. By that resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of that question as a matter of priority.

112. The item "Curbing the naval arms race" was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission in 1985. During that year, the Commission considered that item in plenary meetings, during which a number of views were expressed and proposals were made by delegations (see A/CN.10/PV.93 and 94). At the end of the plenary meetings, the Chairman of the Commission undertook to prepare a report in consultation with "his friends" and other interested delegations. It was not possible, however, to reach consensus on a set of proposals for recommendations. The Commission accordingly decided to refer the question to the General Assembly and thus concluded its consideration of the item.

113. On the subject of naval armaments and disarmament, the General Assembly, in the period under review, adopted resolutions 40/94 F, 41/59 K, 42/38 K, 43/75 L and 44/116 M, 53/ initiated by Sweden. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the question of the

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naval arms race and disarmament, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in that field.

114. Accordingly, the item on naval armaments and disarmament was consecutively included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission of its 1986 to 1990 sessions. Under the responsibility of the Chairman, substantive and open-ended consultations on the item were held which resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations. 54/ These are contained in a working paper by the Chairman (A/CN.10/134) which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which in their view could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject. In 1990, the Disarmament Commission by consensus adopted the report of the Consultation Group on naval armaments and disarmament. By adopting the report referring to substantive findings and recommendations on the subject (A/CN.10/1990/CRP.10), which had met the approval of all delegations participating in the consultations, the Commission concluded the consideration of the item.

115. A working paper on the subject of naval armaments and disarmament was submitted at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly by Finland, Indonesia and Sweden (A/S-15/AC.1/13). In that working paper, the three States made proposals, inter alia, to start defining principles and basic understandings as well as formulating more concrete guidelines for future negotiations concerning naval armaments and disarmament; to study possible additional new regulations in the field of international law; to consider, as a first step towards halting the naval arms race, naval confidence-building measures; and to consider the initiation of negotiations, in an appropriate forum, on a multilateral agreement in addition to the existing bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea. Another working paper on the same subject was submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union (A/S-15/AC.1/16). In that working paper there were, inter alia, proposals to conclude a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas; to establish in specific instances United Nations naval forces; to convene a multilateral meeting of military experts from the major naval Powers and other concerned States; and to hold a special international conference or meeting of the Security Council on naval issues.

116. In July 1986, the Soviet Union proposed measures for reducing naval activities as a substantive confidence-building measure in the Pacific region and announced the Soviet Union's willingness to discuss steps radically to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons in Asia (A/41/505). Some States of the region, however, were doubtful that the existing overall situation in the region would make the proposal feasible. The United States, for its part stated that it could not accept naval arms control measures which were aimed at restricting the use of naval forces or naval capabilities. Such restrictions would, in the view of the United States, have a disproportionate impact on maritime nations, such as the United States, and alliances such as NATO. The United States depended on freedom of navigation and deployment of its naval forces on the high seas, consistent with customary international law, to meet its security obligations and for its own defence.

I. Zones of peace

117. The establishment of zones of peace has been considered in several regions, such as the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia, the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly stated that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, could contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole (resolution S/10-2, para. 64).

1. Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

118. The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was adopted by the General Assembly in 1971 as resolution 2832 (XXVI). By that Declaration, the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the airspace above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all times as a zone of peace. The Declaration, furthermore, called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to: (a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; (b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. In addition, it called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of the Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:
(a) warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;
(c) appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Later, an *ad hoc* committee was established to study the implications of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal and, since 1973, consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean by the General Assembly has generally concentrated on the annual reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

119. The work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee during the past years revealed that the positions of States regarding the convening of the Conference remained basically unchanged. Most of the non-aligned and the socialist members of the Committee are

in favour of convening the Conference not later than 1990, and maintain that progress had been made in some areas of the preparatory work. Some Western States, however, continue to hold the view that an amelioration of the prevailing political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region was essential for the success of the Conference. Nevertheless, the Committee was able to identify and discuss both substantive and procedural issues. In 1987 and 1988, the Working Group of the Committee, which was established in 1986, continued the discussion of substantive issues and was able to make progress in its discussions. In 1989, the Working Group continued consideration of substantive issues and principles relating to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The Ad Hoc Committee exchanged views on organizational and procedural matters, including the provisional agenda for the Conference, the rules of procedure and the structure of the Conference. The Ad Hoc Committee was not able, however, to agree on a draft resolution which it could recommend by consensus to the General Assembly for its consideration. A summary of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is contained in its 1985-1989 annual reports to the General Assembly (A/40/29 to A/44/29) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session (A/S-15/5).

120. The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1988, adopted without a vote, resolutions 40/153, 41/87, 42/43 and 43/79 on the subject of the Indian Ocean. In those resolutions, the General Assembly each year requested the Ad Hoc Committee to accomplish the preparatory work for the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, Sri Lanka, which would consider the effective implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In 1989, contrary to previous years, the General Assembly voted upon the draft resolution on the Indian Ocean and adopted resolution 44/120, 55/ which was initiated by Yugoslavia on behalf of non-aligned countries. By that resolution, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Ad Hoc Committee to complete the remaining preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo in 1991 in consultation with the host country. At the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, on 16 April 1990, the Chairman informed the Committee that France, the United Kingdom and the United States had addressed letters to the Secretary-General on 6 April 1990 informing him that they were withdrawing from the Committee as of that date. According to their letters, the three States have taken that decision on the ground that the consensus principle which had guided the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was broken when resolution 44/120 was put to a vote, and that a conference on the Indian Ocean was convened without an agreement on what matters the Conference should discuss. He also told the Committee that some other Western European and other States members of the Committee would refrain from attending the meetings at the current session.

2. South-East Asia

121. In recent years, Member States of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, have once again referred to the implementation of the Declaration issued by the ASEAN countries in 1971, to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia (A/C.1/1019). At their summit meeting in

December 1987, the ASEAN States, inter alia, emphasized that ASEAN should intensify its efforts towards the early realization of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia as well as the early establishment of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, including the continuation of the consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the zone and of an appropriate instrument to establish the zone (A/43/68; S/19385). As mentioned in paragraph 72 above, the participants at the second Jakarta Informal Meeting, held from 19 to 21 February 1989, shared the view that a comprehensive political solution of the Kampuchea question would accelerate the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace in South-East Asia (A/44/138-S/20477).

3. The Mediterranean

122. The question of the strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region was given further consideration, inter alia, in several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly between 1985 and 1989. By resolutions 40/157, 41/89, 42/90, 43/84 and 44/125, 56/ the General Assembly, inter alia, recognized the strong desire of the non-aligned Mediterranean countries to intensify the process of dialogue and consultations with the European-Mediterranean and other European countries aimed at strengthening efforts towards the promotion of peace, security and co-operation in the region, and thus contributing to the stabilization of the situation in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the General Assembly urged all States to co-operate with the Mediterranean States in the further efforts required to reduce tensions and promote peace, security and co-operation in the region.

123. The issue has also been the subject of efforts by the non-aligned countries, in particular the non-aligned Mediterranean countries. At their summit conference, held at Harare in 1986, as well as at the meeting of the non-aligned Mediterranean countries, held at Brioni, Yugoslavia, in 1987, by the declarations that were adopted, these countries reaffirmed their interest in, inter alia, transforming the Mediterranean into a region of peace, security and co-operation, and the need for concerted action aimed at reducing tensions in the region. The non-aligned countries, at their ninth summit meeting, held in Belgrade in September 1989, supported the transformation of the Mediterranean region into a region of peace, security and co-operation, free from conflict and confrontation.

124. Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 35 participating States have also extensively discussed the issue. In the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe, adopted in September 1986, the participating States, inter alia, confirmed their intention to develop good-neighbourly relations with all States of the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles contained in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Helsinki Final Act. In the Concluding Document of the Vienna CSCE follow-up Conference, adopted in January 1989, the participating States, inter alia, stressed the importance of the CSCE process for increasing

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security and improving co-operation in the Mediterranean area and reiterated their conviction that the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area. The participating States, furthermore, agreed to convene a meeting on the Mediterranean, to be held in Palma de Mallorca from 24 September to 19 October 1990, in order to consider ways and means of further enhancing various aspects of co-operation.

125. Another initiative for strengthening peace and security in the Mediterranean region was taken in March 1988, when the Soviet Union put forward new proposals designed to limit the potential of naval forces in the Mediterranean, to reach agreement on confidence-building measures relating to that region and to ensure the safety of shipping lanes.

4. South Atlantic

126. On the initiative of Brazil, the General Assembly, in 1986, included a new item in the agenda of its forty-first session, entitled "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic". The General Assembly, by resolution 41/11, 57/ sponsored by a group of mainly African and Latin American States, solemnly declared the Atlantic Ocean, in the region situated between Africa and South America, a zone of peace and co-operation. Furthermore, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States of all other regions, in particular the militarily significant States, scrupulously to respect the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-operation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to it. In addition, the General Assembly called upon all States to co-operate in the elimination of all sources of tension in the zone, to respect the national unity, sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of every State therein and to refrain from the threat or use of force. By resolution 42/16, 58/ the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the States of the region to continue their actions aiming at fulfilling the goals of the declaration. In resolution 43/23, 59/ the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the holding of the first meeting of States of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic at Rio de Janeiro, from 25 to 29 July 1988, and took note of the Final Document of the meeting (A/43/512). By resolution 44/20, 60/ the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States to co-operate in the promotion of the objectives of peace and co-operation established in the declaration of the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic and to refrain from any action inconsistent with those objectives, particularly actions which may create or aggravate situations of tension and potential conflict in the region. Pursuant to requests made in the above resolutions, the Secretary-General submitted reports on the implementation of the declaration on the zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic (A/42/557 and Corr.1 and 2; A/43/576 and Add.1; A/44/536).

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J. Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and arms transfers on a world-wide and regional basis

127. Consideration by the United Nations of the question of conventional disarmament, especially in recent years, has revealed growing recognition among many Member States that, without diverting priority efforts from nuclear matters, concern about the continuing arms race in conventional weapons is justified. The United States stated that it held conventional arms control to be essential, and considered conventional force balances and conventional arms control to be an integral part of achieving nuclear weapons reductions. All wars that have taken place since 1945 have been fought with conventional weapons and more than 80 per cent of current costs of armaments in the world are being spent for conventional weapons and armed forces. There seems to be recognition among the international community of the need to achieve significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in various parts of the world, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, as essential elements of the disarmament process. Member States are increasingly aware of the fact that international peace and security cannot be achieved unless the question of the qualitative development, the production and use of conventional weapons as well as all aspects, both overt and covert, of the issue of international arms transfers, are also resolutely addressed. However, although the need for conventional disarmament is recognized, differences have long persisted on how that goal may be pursued, and the results of disarmament efforts devoted to the limitation of conventional armaments and arms transfers on a world-wide or regional basis, both inside and outside the United Nations framework, have still been limited.

1. Conventional disarmament

128. During the period under review, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/94 A, 41/59 M, 42/38 N, 43/75 S and 44/116 S 61/ entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", which were initiated by Peru. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, welcomed the initiatives towards arms limitation and disarmament undertaken jointly or unilaterally by some countries at the regional and subregional levels, as well as the systematic implementation of confidence-building measures, limitations of the acquisition of conventional weapons and the reduction of military spending. Furthermore, the General Assembly expressed its firm support for the United Nations system, and for the Secretary-General in particular, in the efforts to find solutions to conflict situations. It requested the United Nations to promote international peace and security, to provide assistance to States that might request it and appealed to all States to facilitate the progress of regional disarmament, refraining from any action, including the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and intervention or interference in internal affairs of States.

129. At the initiative of China, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 41/59 G, 42/38 G, 43/75 F and 44/116 C. 62/ By those resolutions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, urged the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments

reductions, and the Member States of the two major military alliances, to continue their intensive negotiations on conventional armaments with a view to reaching early agreement on the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armaments and forces at lower levels under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which had the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world. The General Assembly, in addition, encouraged all States to intensify their efforts to promote progress in conventional disarmament. Finally, it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider further issues related to conventional disarmament.

130. Also on the subject of conventional disarmament, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/94 C, 41/59 C, 42/38 E, 43/75 D and 44/116 F, 63/ initiated by Denmark. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the question of conventional disarmament, fully taking into account the recommendations and conclusions contained in the United Nations study on conventional disarmament (A/39/348), as well as all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating possible measures in the fields of conventional arms reduction and disarmament. In a working paper, submitted to the third special session on disarmament (A/S-15/AC.1/3), Denmark, inter alia, suggested that, in addition to the deliberations in the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, also the Conference on Disarmament could address the item of conventional disarmament.

131. The item on conventional disarmament was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission in 1987. During its 1987 to 1990 sessions, the Disarmament Commission considered the item in a working group. The group conducted an extensive exchange of views on substantive issues on the subject on the basis of a number of working papers submitted by the delegations as well as the study on conventional disarmament. In the course of deliberations, many proposals were put forward 64/ and a comprehensive draft report was presented by the Chairman with a view to reaching consensus on a set of recommendations on the subject. During the deliberations, an extensive discussion took place on the basis of the draft text and of proposals made by delegations. However, until 1990 it proved not possible to find agreement on the substantive content of the draft report. In 1990, the Commission, by consensus adopted the report of the Working Group and so concluded its consideration of the item.

2. International arms transfers

132. In 1988 and 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 43/75 I and 44/116 N respectively, 65/ entitled "International arms transfers", which was initiated by Colombia. By the first resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its conviction that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community and requested Member States to consider a number of measures including: (a) reinforcement of their national systems of control and vigilance concerning production and transport of arms; (b) examination of ways and means of refraining from acquiring arms additional to those needed for legitimate national security requirements, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region; (c) examination of the ways and means of

providing for more openness and transparency with regard to world-wide arms transfers. The General Assembly, furthermore, requested the Disarmament Commission to take into account the above-mentioned matters in its deliberations on the issue of conventional disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views and proposals of Member States on the issue and to carry out thereafter a study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. In accordance with resolution 43/75 I, the Disarmament Commission in 1989 discussed the issue of international arms transfers in the framework of the consideration on the item of conventional disarmament. A group of governmental experts, which was established pursuant to resolution 43/75 I, charged with the task of assisting the Secretary-General in carrying out a study on international arms transfers, started its work in January 1990.

3. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects

133. Years of efforts to prohibit the use of certain conventional weapons having excessively inhuman or indiscriminate effects led to the conclusion, in 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its three annexed Protocols. Together they provide new rules for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps and prohibit the use of weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments that cannot be detected by X-ray in the human body. The rules range from a complete ban on the use of such weapons to restrictions on their indiscriminate use against civilians or civilian objects. The convention was opened for signature by the Secretary-General, as Depositary, on 10 April 1981 and entered into force on 2 December 1983. In the period under review, the General Assembly, each year adopted a resolution or decision, respectively on the subject.

4. Limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons

134. Several specific approaches, including unilateral, bilateral and regional, have been suggested for dealing with the question of the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons. The regional approach, so far, has attracted most attention, since it derives from the view that it might be easier to find agreement among States from one particular geographical area than to attempt to find broad solutions applicable to world-wide circumstances.

135. In 1987, Poland made a proposal on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe. This proposal, sometimes referred to as the "Jaruzelski Plan", envisaged the gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of specified, mutually agreed kinds and quantities of weapons both nuclear and conventional; joint actions for an evolutionary transformation of military doctrines towards a

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strictly defensive character; as well as agreement on appropriate far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures, including the mechanism for the strict verification of compliance with the commitments undertaken (A/42/413).

136. In 1987, a summit meeting (Esquipulas I Summit Meeting) between Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras was held at San José on 15 February. At that meeting, a proposal was put forward by the President of Costa Rica (Arias Plan), in which it was, inter alia, suggested that the five Central American States begin "negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of troops under arms". Such negotiations should also cover measures for the disarming of irregular forces operating in the region (A/42/130-S/18697). The proposal was further considered at a summit meeting held at Guatemala City (Esquipulas II Summit Meeting), where, on 7 August 1987, the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua signed a document entitled "Procedure for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America". In that document, the five Central American States, inter alia, agreed to continue negotiations on the points outstanding in the draft Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America with regard to security, verification and control. Those negotiations should also cover measures for disarming irregular forces prepared to avail themselves of amnesty decrees (A/42/521-S/19085). The Central American Presidents, at a meeting held at Costa del Sol, El Salvador, on 13/14 February 1989, reviewed the status of the Central American peace process and adopted decisions required to put it into effect (A/44/140-S/20491). Further agreements were reached by the five Presidents during a meeting held at Tela, Honduras, from 5 to 7 August 1989 (A/44/451-S/20778).

137. In recent times, also a number of unilateral steps have been taken in the conventional field. In November 1986, Romania decided unilaterally to carry out a 5 per cent reduction in its arms and troops. Further to its 1985 announcement (A/40/411 and A/40/PV.14), China declared in March 1987 that measures for the reduction of its armed forces by 1 million personnel had been completed and that parts of military facilities were being converted into civilian services. The Soviet Union, in December 1988, announced that within the following two years, it would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and substantially reduce its conventional armaments. By 1991, Soviet forces stationed in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be reduced by 50,000 men and their armaments by 5,000 tanks. In total, Soviet armed forces in the European part of the country and in the territories of its European allies would be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. Armed forces in the Asian part would also be significantly reduced, and military facilities would be converted into civilian services (A/43/PV.72). Following that step, other Warsaw Treaty member States also made announcements on unilateral reductions: Bulgaria - 10,000 men, 200 tanks, 20 combat aircraft, 200 artillery systems; Czechoslovakia - 12,000 men, 850 tanks, 51 combat aircraft, 165 armoured vehicles; German Democratic Republic - 10,000 men, 600 tanks, 50 combat aircraft; Hungary - 9,300 men, 251 tanks, 9 combat aircraft, 30 armoured vehicles, 430 artillery systems; Poland - 40,000 men, 850 tanks, 80 combat aircraft, 700 armoured vehicles and 900 artillery systems. Mongolia also stated that it would reduce its armed forces by 13,000 men in the 1989-1990 period. In May 1989, the United States, for its part, proposed a 20 per cent cut in its armed forces stationed in Western Europe and a resulting

ceiling in United States and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic to the Ural zone at approximately 275,000 each. On 31 January 1990, the United States modified its position further by proposing a ceiling of 195,000 in Central and Eastern Europe from each of the two major Powers. Negotiations on the issue of conventional forces in Europe are being carried out in Vienna between the 23 member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see para. 140 below).

(a) Declaration of Ayacucho

138. In the Declaration of Ayacucho, which was signed at Lima in 1974, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela expressed their commitment to create conditions conducive to effective arms limitation, and to stop the acquisition of arms for aggressive ends. They also condemned the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes (A/10044, annex). The principles of this Declaration were reaffirmed in 1978 in a joint communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of those same countries, in which they expressed their countries' willingness to explore, together with the other Latin American countries, possibilities for reaching an agreement on limiting conventional weapons in the region (A/S-10/AC.1/34, annex). Subsequently, at a meeting in Mexico City in August 1978, representatives from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries agreed to propose for the consideration of their Governments the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism relating to disarmament matters in the field of conventional weapons in general and called upon all countries of the region to participate in those endeavours.

(b) Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe

139. Negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe were held in Vienna between 1973 and 1989. The member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization participating in the negotiations were Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania and Turkey participated with special status. Although there was some *rapprochement* of positions, basic divergences remained on various issues including the numbers currently stationed in the area, as well as procedures to verify the withdrawals. Given this situation, and the fact that the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was scheduled to begin in March 1989 (see para. 140 below), these negotiations were ended on 2 February 1989 by mutual agreement among the participants.

(c) Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

140. Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started on 6 March 1989 in Vienna. Participants in the negotiations are the 23 member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. According to the mandate, the objective of the negotiation should be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional

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armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. The subject of the negotiations should be the conventional armed forces, armaments and equipment of the participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

141. On 9 March 1989, both sides to the negotiations submitted proposals for a future agreement. According to the WTO document, the following objectives were stated: "(1) to strengthen stability and security in Europe through deep cuts in conventional armed forces, including conventional armaments and equipment, of the Warsaw Treaty member States and of the NATO member countries so as to establish in this way a balance at lower levels at which both military alliances will keep forces and systems necessary solely for defence and insufficient to launch surprise attack or conduct offensive operations; to restructure and redeploy their armed forces on strictly defensive principles; (2) The process of strengthening stability and security on the European continent should proceed stage by stage and in a manner that will not upset the overall balance or prejudice anyone's security at all stages of the negotiations; (3) These objectives will be achieved through reductions, limitations, appropriate redeployment measures, equal collective ceilings on armed forces and conventional armaments both throughout the European zone and in its individual regions. The scope and procedure of reduction of national and foreign troops down to agreed levels would be decided upon within each alliance on the basis of the principles and criteria to be agreed at the negotiation; (4) The reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments will be effected on the basis of reciprocity, with all the participating States without exception making their appropriate contributions with account taken of their military potentials. The reductions will be accompanied by corresponding cuts in military expenditures and by measures to convert their military production; (5) All the participants will refrain from steps running counter to the above objectives and will not build up their conventional armed forces and armaments; (6) These objectives can be achieved both through agreed steps and unilateral measures to reduce their armed forces and armaments."

142. The document submitted by the NATO participants defined the following objectives: "the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action."
To this end the Alliance put forward specific proposals, entailing reductions to an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe concentrating on the most threatening systems, i.e. those capable of seizing and holding territory; a limit on the proportion of these total holdings belonging to any one country in Europe; a limit on stationed forces; and appropriate numerical sublimits on forces which will apply simultaneously throughout the Atlantic to the Urals area. In addition to these measures, which would necessitate substantial reductions, verification measures were proposed to ensure that all States can have confidence in compliance with them. At the same time, the Alliance advocated creating greater openness about military organization and activities in Europe. The proposed

measures, which were to back-up the régime of reductions, include measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to deployment, storage, movement and levels of readiness and availability of conventional forces.

143. In the course of 1989, a convergence of positions took place, and new draft treaties were submitted by the two respective alliances on 14 December 1989. Both NATO and WTO member States are now in general agreement regarding the military categories that are to be limited by a CFE treaty: tanks, artillery, armoured troop carriers (ATCs), combat aircraft and helicopters and manpower. Both sides are close on ceilings for tanks, artillery and ATCs. It is agreed that measures will have to be developed to deal with verification, including on-site inspections. However, there are numerous problems to be resolved on such matters as definitions, counting rules, ceilings for aircraft and manpower and verification. At their summit meeting in Washington, in May/June 1990, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to speed up the CFE negotiations so that an agreement could be achieved by the end of 1990.

K. Reduction of military budgets

144. The reduction of military expenditures has been seen both as a measure that would contribute to halting the arms race and as a means of releasing resources for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. There has been no controversy about the potential benefits to be derived from the reduction of military budgets and reallocation of the resources released to peaceful endeavours, including development assistance. Opinions differ, however, as to how measures of budget reduction should be implemented.

145. The Final Document stated that gradual reductions of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries (resolution S/10-2, para. 89).

146. The General Assembly, in 1985 adopted resolution 40/91 B, 66/ initiated by Sweden. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note with appreciation of the report of the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets (A/40/421) and stressed the need to increase the number of States reporting on their military expenditures with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems. In 1989, by resolution 44/114 B, 67/ which was initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany, the General Assembly, inter alia, considered that transparency requires also agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems and called upon all States to make use of the reporting system.

147. Between 1985 and 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 40/91 A, 41/57, 42/36 and 43/73, 68/ initiated by Romania. By those resolutions, the

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General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue consideration of the item on the reduction of military budgets and to conclude its work on the principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets. Pursuant to those requests, the Disarmament Commission, during the period under review, considered the subject of reduction of military budgets first in a Working Group and subsequently in a consultation group established by the Commission. In the course of deliberations, many proposed principles and ideas were generally accepted, on a provisional basis and subject to reaching agreement on all the principles and the text as a whole. By the end of the 1986 session, provisional agreement was achieved on the text embodying an entire set of principles concerning the reduction of military budgets entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets", except for paragraph 7, which dealt with the principles of transparency, comparability, and availability of meaningful and reliable data, in particular, through the use of the standardized international reporting instrument. Although various proposals were put forward on paragraph 7 and other elements with a view to reaching consensus on other aspects of the text, no agreement was reached and some delegations reserved the right to review all aspects of the text. In 1989, by resolution 44/114 A, 69/ the General Assembly, *inter alia*, took note of the principles which were annexed to the resolution and decided to bring them to the attention of Member States and of the Conference on Disarmament as useful guidelines for further action in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

148. In recent years, a number of countries have undertaken unilateral steps for reducing their military expenditures. Romania, in 1986, decided to make a 5 per cent reduction in its military expenditures. China reported that previous cuts in its military expenditures and the large-scale re-orientation of its military industry to civilian production had produced some preliminary economic benefits. The Soviet Union, in 1988 announced a unilateral reduction of its military budget by 14.2 per cent and of its military production by 20 per cent. The following cuts in military budgets were announced by other WTO member States: Bulgaria - 12 per cent; Czechoslovakia - 15 per cent; German Democratic Republic - 10 per cent. Poland also stated that it had systematically lowered expenditure for national defence since 1987.

L. Confidence-building measures

149. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, according to the Final Document, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament (resolution S/10-2, para. 93).

150. The General Assembly, between 1986 and 1988 on the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, adopted resolutions 41/60 C, 42/39 F and 43/78 H. 70/ The General Assembly, by resolution 42/39 F, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to finalize the "draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a

global or regional level". By resolution 43/78 H, the Assembly endorsed the guidelines as having been elaborated by the Disarmament Commission. In 1989, the General Assembly, by consensus resolution 44/116 U, inter alia, welcomed the implementation of confidence-building measures as contained in the Final Act of Helsinki and on that basis the positive experience gathered since 1987; expressed the expectation that the ongoing Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures would build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference; and reaffirmed its invitation to all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions.

151. The Disarmament Commission, after not having discussed the issue in 1985, took up the subject of guidelines for confidence-building measures again in 1986. After intensive work, all paragraphs of a text of draft guidelines, except for three paragraphs, were agreed upon. Agreement on those outstanding paragraphs was reached in 1988, and the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" (A/S-15/3).

152. The issue of confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament has also been discussed in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Having adopted the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the 35 participating States held major follow-up meetings at Belgrade from 1977 to 1978, at Madrid from 1980 to 1983 and at Vienna from 1986 to 1989.

153. The Madrid follow-up meeting agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The first stage of the Conference was held at Stockholm from 1984 to 1986 and ended with the adoption of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, which contained a set of concrete, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures. Under a mandate from the Vienna CSCE Review Conference of 1986-1989, the Vienna negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) opened on 6 March 1989. The agreed aim of the negotiations consists in elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. At the CSBM Conference, there are now three sets of proposals under consideration, one by the 12 neutral and non-aligned States of the CSCE, one by the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and one by NATO. There is broad agreement in principle on proposed measures to focus on openness and transparency in the field of military information and activities, e.g., for exchanges of information on command structure, personnel strength, and equipment of land forces. However, there are fundamental differences on other proposals. A seminar on military doctrine was held from 16 January to 5 February 1990 in Vienna, with the 35 CSCE member States participating. In June 1990, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic and Poland submitted a joint proposal to the other 32 CSCE member States for the establishment of a secretariat of a "Council for Security and Co-operation in Europe" in Prague and of a "Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Verification Centre" in Berlin.

154. The General Assembly, in 1986 adopted two resolutions dealing with the CSCE process. By consensus resolution 41/86 L, initiated by Sweden, the General Assembly welcomed the adoption of the Stockholm Document and considered that it would contribute to furthering the process of improving security and developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole. In the second resolution, 41/59 E, 71/ which was initiated by France, the General Assembly, in addition to welcoming the Stockholm document, inter alia, expressed the hope that after the adoption of confidence- and security-building measures at Stockholm, steps would be agreed upon in order to make further progress in strengthening confidence and security and achieving disarmament in Europe. Furthermore, the General Assembly invited all States, with full account to be taken of specific regional conditions, to consider the achievement of lessening confrontation by confidence- and security-building measures, which contribute to reducing the danger of surprise attacks, diminishing the possibility of misunderstanding or political pressure through the use of military strength and reducing misinterpretations that could worsen crises and eventually lead to conflict. France also initiated consensus resolution 43/75 P, by which the General Assembly welcomed the progress achieved in the Vienna CSCE follow-up Conference and urged Member States participating in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures as well as on conventional armaments and forces to contribute actively to the attainment of their objectives.

155. In 1989, the General Assembly, by resolution 44/116 I, which was initiated by France and adopted by consensus, inter alia, noted with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the deliberations of the Vienna CSCE follow-up Conference. The General Assembly welcomed the opening of and the progress achieved so far in the CSBM and the CFE negotiations and expressed the hope that they would be successfully concluded at an early date. In addition, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 P, 72/ entitled "Defensive security concepts and policies", initiated by the German Democratic Republic. By that resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, considered the development of an international dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies to be of great importance for promoting the process of achieving disarmament and strengthening international security; and invited Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels and to keep the General Assembly informed about the progress achieved.

156. In 1988, Czechoslovakia put forward the idea of the establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The proposal comprises in equal measure the military, political, economic, ecological and humanitarian fields. In the military field it envisages the gradual forming of a "diluted" zone where the level of military confrontation would be reduced, from which the most dangerous types of offensive weapons would be eliminated and where significant confidence-building measures would be adopted (A/43/214).

157. A conference on the "open skies" concept was held in Ottawa, Canada, from 12 to 28 February 1990. The participating NATO and WTO member States agreed in principle that each alliance would open its airspace to the other side. The objective of this accord is to strengthen confidence between both alliances, to

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reduce the risk of conflict and to enhance the predictability of military activities in participating countries, by allowing each side to inspect the other from the air. A second phase of the open skies conference was held in Budapest, Hungary, from 23 April to 12 May 1990. The conference was inconclusive but it is understood that further discussions will take place later in 1990.

M. Disarmament and development

158. The interrelationship between disarmament and development and the harmful consequences of the arms race for the economic and social development of all countries has been a growing concern within the United Nations framework during recent years. In the Final Document of 1978 it is stated that "There is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries" (resolution S/10-2, para. 35).

159. The General Assembly, during the period under review, adopted several resolutions on questions of disarmament and development. By resolution 40/155, [73] which was initiated by France, the General Assembly decided to hold an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1986. The Conference was postponed, however, until 1987 and, in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/422, was held from 24 August to 11 September 1987 in New York. It considered three agenda items: (a) the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions; (b) the implications of the level and magnitude of military expenditures, in particular those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries and formulation of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures; and (d) ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes, in particular for the benefit of developing countries.

160. In the Final Document of the Conference (A/CONF.130/39), which was adopted by consensus, the participating States recognized that, while disarmament and development were distinct processes that should each be pursued vigorously, regardless of the pace of progress in the other, they had a close and multidimensional relationship, which was in part derived from the fact that the continuing global arms race and development compete for the same finite resources. In the Final Document, it was further stated that, in the relationship between disarmament and development, security played a crucial role. It was pointed out that progress in any of the three areas would have a positive effect on the others. According to the Final Document, security consisted of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights, and ecological aspects. The Final Document of the Conference included an Action Programme intended to foster an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security; to promote multilateralism as the international framework for shaping the

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relationship between disarmament, development and security; and to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development. The United Nations system was requested to monitor trends in military spending; to promote collective knowledge of non-military threats to security; and to facilitate exchanges of experience in the field of conversion.

161. The United States of America did not participate in the preparations for the Conference or in the Conference itself, on the grounds that it saw no inherent relationship between disarmament and development. The United States subsequently explained that the decision not to participate was not to be seen as sign of a decrease in that country's support for arms control and disarmament or for international economic development. The United States was of the view that it was doubtful that resource transfers from the developed to the developing world constituted the basic engine of development; disarmament should, therefore, be pursued for its own merits, not for its possible contribution to development.

162. In resolution 42/45, which was initiated by India, the General Assembly welcomed the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference, as contained in its report to the Assembly. By the same resolution, as well as by resolutions 43/75 B and 44/116 L, 74/ which were initiated by Zimbabwe and Yugoslavia respectively, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate organs, within available resources, for the implementation of the Action Programme adopted at the International Conference. In 1989, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 44/116 J, 75/ entitled "Conversion of military resources", which was initiated by Bulgaria. By that resolution, the General Assembly invited Member States to submit to the Secretary-General their views concerning various aspects of the conversion of military resources to civilian purposes.

N. World Disarmament Campaign

163. In the Final Document of its Tenth Special Session in 1978, the General Assembly emphasized the importance of mobilizing public opinion on behalf of disarmament and encouraged Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control (resolution S/10-2, paras. 15, 99-107, and 123).

164. The World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations was launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, in 1982, in response to the recognition by Member States that a well-informed body of world public opinion could exercise a positive and constructive role in the process of disarmament. Therefore, the Campaign aims at informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. In order for the Campaign to be effective, two principles guide its implementation - dissemination of balanced, factual and objective information; and the implementation of the Campaign on a

universal basis. Since the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign, the United Nations has endeavoured: (a) to expand and improve the geographical balance of the register of constituencies of the Campaign, namely non-governmental organizations, educational communities, research institutes, the media and elected representatives; (b) to increase the dissemination of United Nations disarmament information materials to all regions of the world and in languages other than the official ones; (c) to organize seminars, conferences and meetings in different regions and at United Nations Headquarters; (d) to organize special events which could draw additional attention to disarmament and to the work of the United Nations in this field; (e) to undertake speaking engagements and to participate in meetings organized by various constituencies of the Campaign; (f) to publicize the Campaign; and (g) to expand the activities of the United Nations field offices and information centres in support of the Campaign. Regional seminars and conferences for non-governmental organizations, research institutes, educational communities and the media have so far been organized in many countries covering various regions of the world.

165. Within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, a number of activities are arranged in co-ordination with the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament recently established in Nepal, Peru and Togo. As part of the World Disarmament Campaign activities, a number of events are organized in observance of Disarmament Week at the end of October each year. Disarmament Week involves planning activities at Headquarters, at Geneva and around the world, the latter usually in co-operation with United Nations information centres. The Week is observed by the First Committee and a pledging conference for the Campaign and the regional centres is held at Headquarters during that week.

166. The General Assembly, between 1985 and 1989 adopted resolutions 40/151 B, 41/60 B, 42/39 G, 43/76 C and 44/117 A, 76/ initiated by Mexico. In 1985 and 1986 the General Assembly also adopted resolutions 40/151 D and 41/60 A, 77/ respectively, which were initiated by Bulgaria. In pursuance of these resolutions, the Secretary-General submitted a special report at the fifteenth special session as well as annual reports to the General Assembly on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign. 78/

O. World disarmament conference

167. The idea of convening a world disarmament conference originated at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in 1961. The subject was included in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in 1971, at the request of the Soviet Union. At its twenty-seventh session, the General Assembly decided to establish a special committee on the world disarmament conference and, at its twenty-eighth session, it established an *ad hoc* committee to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the subject.

168. The *Ad Hoc* Committee continued its work during the period under review. Until 1987, the Committee met on a regular basis and reported annually to the General Assembly, which each year adopted a resolution, *inter alia*, renewing the mandate of

the *Ad Hoc* Committee. At its sessions, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support by the membership of the United Nations; however, there were varying degrees of emphasis on, and differences concerning, the conditions and certain aspects related to the question of the convening of such a conference, including aspects related to the deteriorating international situation. With respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference, no consensus has yet been reached among the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation in such a conference is deemed essential by most Member States of the Organization. In 1987, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/61, which was adopted without a vote, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly on the positions of all nuclear-weapon States, as well as of other States, regarding the convening of such a conference. In its special report at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-15/4), the *Ad Hoc* Committee recognized the continuing validity of the initiative for the convening of a world disarmament conference. However, taking into consideration the divergence of views as to the immediate convening of such a conference, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended to the General Assembly that the work of the Committee be suspended until such time as the Assembly deems it appropriate to reactivate it.

Notes

1/ Resolution 43/77 B was adopted by 152 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

2/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/151 F (126-17-6); 41/60 F (132-17-4); 42/39 C (135-17-4); 43/76 E (133-17-4); 44/117 C (134-17-4).

3/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/152 A (123-19-7); 41/86 B (118-17-10); 42/42 A (125-17-12); 43/78 B (127-17-6); 44/119 B (129-17-7).

4/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/152 Q (136-3-14); 41/86 G (134-3-14); 42/42 D (140-3-14); 43/78 F (136-3-14).

5/ Resolution 44/119 E was adopted by 138 votes to 11, with 6 abstentions.

6/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/152 G (141-1-10); 41/86 H (140-1-10).

7/ Resolution 43/78 D was adopted by 145 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

8/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985 to 1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/40/27 to A/44/27).

9/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/152 P (131-16-6); 41/86 F (130-15-5); 42/42 C (137-13-7) and 43/78 E (135-13-5).

10/ Resolution 40/152 C was adopted by 117 votes to 19, with 11 abstentions.

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Notes (continued)

11/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the special report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/3) and in the Commission's annual reports to the General Assembly (A/44/42 and A/45/42).

12/ The list of documents on the item may be found in the 1985 to 1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its fortieth to forty-fourth sessions (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

13/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/151 E (126-12-10); 41/60 E (136-12-5); 42/39 B (139-12-4).

14/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/151 C (131-10-8); 41/60 I (139-12-4); 42/39 H (140-13-2).

15/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 43/76 B (135-12-3); 44/117 D (136-13-5).

16/ Resolution 40/94 H was adopted by 120 votes to 17, with 10 abstentions.

17/ Resolution 40/152 H was adopted by 70 votes to 11, with 65 abstentions.

18/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/94 G (145-1-7); 41/59 L (148-1-6); 42/38 L (149-1-6); 43/75 K (144-1-7); 44/116 H (147-1-6).

19/ Resolution 40/18 was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 12 abstentions, and resolution 41/86 N was adopted by 140 to none, with 13 abstentions.

20/ Resolution 42/38 D was adopted by 143 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

21/ Resolution 43/75 A was adopted by 141 votes to none, with 12 abstentions.

22/ Resolution 44/116 K was adopted by 134 votes to none, with 18 abstentions.

23/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/152 B (107-0-40); 41/86 A (88-0-56); 42/38 A (115-0-39); 43/75 O (103-0-46); 44/116 B (91-0-61).

24/ An updated version of the declarations can be found in the annex to NPT/CONF.IV/11.

25/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/85 (101-19-25); 41/51 (106-18-25); 42/31 (112-18-20); 43/68 (117-17-16); 44/110 (131-0-21).

Notes (continued)

26/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/86 (142-0-6); 41/52 (149-0-4); 42/32 (151-0-3), 43/69 (152-0-3); 44/111 (151-0-3).

27/ The list of documents on the item may be found in document CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.5 and A/44/27.

28/ A memorandum on the implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America has been prepared by the secretariat of OPANAL and is distributed as document NPT/CONF.IV/15.

29/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/79 (139-0-7); 41/45 (145-0-7); 42/25 (147-0-7); 43/62 (149-0-5); 44/104 (147-0-3).

30/ Resolution 44/119 F was adopted by 151 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

31/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/89 A (148-0-6); 41/55 A (150-0-5); 42/34 A (151-0-4); 43/71 A (151-0-4); 44/113 A (147-0-4).

32/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/89 B (135-4-14); 41/55 B (139-4-13); 42/34 B (140-4-13); 43/71 B (138-4-12); 44/113 B (137-4-10).

33/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/83 (104-3-41); 41/49 (107-3-41); 42/29 (114-3-36); 43/66 (116-3-34); 44/109 (116-3-32).

34/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

35/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/93 (101-2-47); 41/93 (95-2-56); 42/44 (97-2-52); 43/80 (99-2-51); 44/121 (104-2-43).

36/ Resolution 44/119 A was adopted by 154 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

37/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

38/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/90 (128-1-21); 41/56 (128-1-25); 42/35 (135-1-18); 43/72 (152-0-2).

39/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

40/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 43/77 A (129-7-14); 44/118 A (137-3-14).

Notes (continued)

41/ Resolution 44/118 B was adopted by 154 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

42/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 41/59 I (111-3-38); 42/38 F (119-2-32); 43/75 J (116-2-29); 44/116 A (124-2-26).

43/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

44/ Resolution 43/75 Q was adopted by 129 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions. Resolution 43/75 T was adopted by 141 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

45/ Resolution 44/116 R was adopted by 150 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

46/ Resolution 40/92 A was adopted by 93 votes to 15, with 41 abstentions and resolution 41/58 B was adopted by 100 votes to 11, with 43 abstentions.

47/ Resolution 40/92 C was adopted by 112 votes to 16, with 22 abstentions and resolution 41/58 C was adopted by 137 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

48/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

49/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

50/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/87 (151-0-2); 41/53 (154-0-1); 42/33 (154-1-0); 43/70 (154-1-0); 44/112 (153-1-0).

51/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1989 annual reports of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/40/27 to A/44/27) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/2).

52/ Resolution 40/94 I was adopted by 71 votes to 19, with 59 abstentions.

53/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/94 F (146-1-3); 41/59 K (153-1-1); 42/38 K (154-1-2); 43/75 L (152-1-1); 44/116 M (154-1-0).

54/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the 1985-1990 annual reports of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly (A/40/42 to A/45/42) and in the special report submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/3).

55/ Resolution 44/120 was adopted with 137 votes to 4, with 14 abstentions.

Notes (continued)

56/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

57/ Resolution 41/11 was adopted by 124 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.

58/ Resolution 42/16 was adopted by 122 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.

59/ Resolution 43/23 was adopted by 144 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions.

60/ Resolution 44/20 was adopted by 146 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

61/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/94 A (128-0-8); 41/59 M (137-0-7); 42/38 N (154-0-0); 43/75 S (125-0-23); 44/116 S (119-1-31).

62/ Resolution 41/59 G was adopted by 150 votes to none, with 2 abstentions; resolutions 42/38 G, 43/75 F and 44/116 C were adopted without a vote.

63/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

64/ The list of relevant documents may be found in the special report of the Disarmament Commission submitted to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/3) and in the annual reports (A/44/42 and A/45/42).

65/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 43/75 I (110-13-15); 44/116 N (143-0-12).

66/ Resolution 40/91 B was adopted by 113 votes to 1, with 38 abstentions.

67/ Resolution 44/114 B was adopted by 127 votes to 0, with 15 abstentions.

68/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

69/ Resolution 44/114 A was adopted by 116 votes to 10, with 19 abstentions.

70/ All resolutions were adopted without a vote.

71/ Resolution 41/59 E was adopted by 129 votes to none, with 21 abstentions.

72/ Resolution 44/116 P was adopted by 131 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions.

73/ Resolution 40/155 was adopted without a vote.

74/ All three resolutions were adopted without a vote.

75/ Resolution 44/116 J was adopted by 153 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.

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Notes (continued)

76/ The resolutions were adopted with the following voting results: 40/151 B (139-0-11); 41/60 B (144-0-9); 42/39 G (146-1-9); 43/76 C (144-0-10); 44/117 A (144-0-10).

77/ Resolution 40/151 D was adopted by 114 votes to none, with 34 abstentions. Resolution 41/60 A was adopted by 114 votes to 3, with 36 abstentions.

78/ See for example A/S-15/9, A/43/642 and A/44/647.
